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Abstract
Twelve percent of the Malawian population is HIV infected. Eighteen
percent of sexual encounters are casual. A condom is used a third of the
time. To analyze the Malawian epidemic, a choice-theoretic general equi-
librium search model is constructed. In the developed framework, people
select between different sexual practices while knowing the inherent risk.
The calibrated model is used to study several policy interventions; namely,
ART, circumcision, better condoms, and the treatment of other STDs. The
efficacy of public policy depends upon the induced behavioral changes and
equilibrium effects. The framework complements the insights from epidemi-
ological studies and small-scale field experiments.
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1 Introduction
HIV/AIDS is a major cause of death, currently killing about 1 million people
worldwide each year. Within Africa most transmissions occur through hetero-
sexual sex. Furthermore, the majority of the HIV-positive population in African
countries is female, compared to less than one third in most developed coun-
tries. A natural question is: What can and should be done to prevent the disease?
Public policy remedies depend not only on their medical efficacy, but also on the
behavior of the population: A treatment that has beenmedically shown to reduce
HIV transmission at the level of an individual might be less effective if the person
starts engaging in more risky sexual practices. This behavioral response is am-
plified in equilibrium, since fewer infections in the population at large reduces
the negative consequences of risky sexual practices further.
The idea that an endogenous response by the population could reduce policy
effectiveness has long been recognized in the theoretical disease transmission lit-
erature (Philipson and Posner (1993)). In the most extreme case behavioral ad-
justment can be so large that a policy backfires, leading to more HIV infections,
as in Kremer (1996). Yet, to date, the degree to which behavioral reactions might
quantitatively reduce or even negate the effectiveness of interventions has not
been assessed. In fact, existing theoretical models are not even designed for a
quantitative assessment. Quantitatively accounting for this behavioral channel
seems prudent so as to not overstate the likely effectiveness of policies. This pa-
per takes an important step toward filling this gap.
The main vehicle of analysis is a novel computational choice-theoretic equilib-
rium model of sexual behavior. It is used to address the HIV/AIDS epidemic
in Malawi; background is provided in Section 2. The model, which is set up in
Section 3, features several margins of risky sexual behavior with three goals ex-
plicitly in mind: 1) to capture aspects of choice that are particularly relevant to
HIV transmission; 2) to match sexual behavior against existing data, an aspect
that was not possible in previous theoretical work; and 3) to analyze the impor-
tance of shifts in sexual behavior for public policy.1
1The use of quantitative choice-theoretic models to study HIV transmission appears to be rare.
One instance is Magruder (2011) who builds a matchingmodel of marital partner search andHIV.
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In the tradition of homo economicus, each individual in themodel rationally chooses
their sexual behavior to maximize expected discounted lifetime utility. Specif-
ically, people choose what kind of sexual relationship they are looking for by
searching in one of three different "markets" or "meeting places"—for long-term
sex, casual sex with condoms, or casual unprotected sex. This market structure
eliminates any problem with differences in interests between partners: they have
the same desires when they meet in the same market. Finding a partner gen-
erates utility from sexual behavior. Marriage (or a long-term relationship) has
the additional benefit of continued interaction without the need to search again.
Searching in a market has both a convex effort cost and the cost of possibly con-
tracting HIV. In line with the data, transmission rates differ according to gender,
condom usage, antiretroviral therapy (ART) availability, and male circumcision.
People knowwhether or not they themselves are infectedwithHIV. But, crucially,
when agreeing to sex, individuals do not know whether their partner is infected,
treated, or circumcised. When entering a meeting place for a relationship, they
rationally recognize that some of these markets will be riskier than others.2
Individuals differ across several dimensions in the model. Men and women fea-
ture separately. The degree of patience is allowed to vary across individuals,
which induces different people to weigh the risk of sexual behavior differently.
As people age, they become on average more patient. Men may be circumcised
or not. People are endogenously heterogeneous in whether they are healthy or
HIV-infected (with or without symptoms). In the presence of ART, infected peo-
ple will further differ by whether or not they are being treated.
A stationary equilibrium is solved for. In equilibrium, each market is character-
ized by its endogenous riskiness and by a transfer that one partner makes to the
other. These transfers clear the market and depend on the desires of men relative
to women. There is also an adverse selection problem: Individuals with a pro-
clivity toward risky sexual behavior are inclined to enter the market for casual
unprotected sex. As a consequence, this market tends to have a high rate of HIV.
This work, however, abstracts from condom use and equilibrium effects, so there is no feedback
from individual choices to the prevalence of the disease in society.
2Endogenous sorting can render sex in marriage safer than in casual relationships. A compan-
ion paper addresses policies that promote marriage and dissuade divorce; see Greenwood et al.
(2017).
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The private information problem regarding a partner’s health status dissuades
healthy individuals, without such a proclivity toward risky sexual behavior, from
entering this market. This exacerbates the riskiness of the market for casual un-
protected sex.
The model is solved numerically and calibrated in Section 4 to match key mo-
ments of HIV and sexual behavior in Malawi. The presence of multiple markets,
private information, and randomness in meeting a partner and in contracting
HIV renders the model too complicated for analytical results. The calibration
matches most targeted moments well, even though the model is sparse on gen-
der differences.
Four policy experiments are conducted in Section 5: male circumcision (Sec-
tion 5.1), ART (Section 5.2), better condoms (Section 5.3), and the treatment of
other sexually transmitted diseases or STDs (Section 5.4). Medical research sug-
gests that male circumcision reduces the female-to-male transmission risk of HIV.
Small-scale field experiments suggest that circumcised males engage in more
risky sexual behavior. The model shows that if one simply applied this reduced
transmission risk and behavioral changes at the individual level, without ac-
counting for the general equilibrium spillover effects on their partners, the HIV
rate would only be moderately affected by circumcision.3 Yet in cross-country
data—which serve as the next-best assessment in lieu of large-scale circumcision
experiments—one sees large changes in the HIV rate with respect to the fraction
of circumcised males. The calibrated model predicts that male circumcision is in-
deed quite effective in curbing HIV prevalence. The beneficial effects of reduced
HIV transmission powerfully accumulate in equilibrium and dominate the (nev-
ertheless non-trivial) behavior adjustments going in the opposite direction. At
the country level, equilibrium forces kick in as not only individuals, but also
their partners, and their partners’ partners, are affected. The model replicates the
(non-targeted) cross-country evidence on circumcision, yielding credibility to the
3Throughout the paper “HIV rate” is used as shorthand for “HIV prevalence rate.” Prevalence
is a stock variable. One might also be interested in the flow or incidence; i.e., new infections.
Whenever incidence (measured as new infections per 1,000 healthy people) is meant instead, this
is explicitly specified. In themodel there is a tight relationship between incidence and prevalence,
since the analysis focuses on steady states. Hence, the numbers for prevalence are often the only
ones reported.
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results that it produces.
ART is a complex policy. By treating the sick, infected people live longer and
have more time to infect others. Moreover, since infection is no longer perceived
as such a bad event, healthy people engage in more risky behavior. Even though
the treated are less infectious to others, these effects may dominate and HIV
may actually rise. The quantitative results show that whether ART reduces or
increases the HIV rate depends on the fraction of the infected population treated.
When less than 50% of the infected are treated, the two effects roughly cancel out,
and the HIV rate is largely unaffected. Only when more than half of the infected
are treated does the reduced infectiousness become powerful enough to decrease
the overall HIV rate.
The acceptability of condoms is also a major issue. Studies attribute low accept-
ability to a number of hard technical problems such as “comfort and breakage”
and “unpleasant smell,” as well soft attitudinal problems due to their stigmatiza-
tion because of the link to STDs. Suppose one could increase the utility from con-
dom usage, either through technological or attitudinal interventions. The simu-
lations suggest that better condoms have a potential to backfire. People would
use them, but they would in parallel increase their sexual activity in single life
(both protected and unprotected), which could lead to an increase in the HIV
rate. Medical research also suggests that the treatment of STDs leads to a reduc-
tion in the transmission risk of HIV. The analysis suggests that this could have a
moderate effect on reducing HIV.
Finally, the paper analyzes the importance of information about the disease. An
extension is presented in Section 6 in which a fraction of the population is un-
aware that abstinence and condom use reduce the odds of infection. The exten-
sion is used to investigate to what extent better information contributed to the
HIV decline over time. When reducing the fraction of uninformed people in line
with the data, the model predicts a decline in HIV incidence between 1996 and
2004 comparable to the one observed in the data. The reason is that better in-
formed people engage in less risky behavior. Thus, better information probably
played a large role in the positive changes Malawi has seen in its HIV rates.
This work ties inwith two other scientificmethodologies used to studyHIV/AIDS,
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namely, epidemiological studies and small-scale field experiments. The policy
experiment results obtained from the choice-theoretic general equilibriummodel
are compared with those arising from synthetic versions of epidemiological stud-
ies and small-scale field experiments. The epidemiological literature on dis-
ease transmission in general, and HIV in particular, is large, but does not model
decision-making and consequently takes sexual behavior as exogenous (see Het-
hcote (2000) for a comprehensive overview of the mathematical modeling of in-
fectious disease). Additionally, the infected and uninfected mix randomly.4 Sev-
eral studies suggest that people react to a higher presence of HIV/AIDS by ad-
justing aspects of their sexual behavior (Wellings et al. (1994)). As will be dis-
cussed, behavioral changes can reduce the effectiveness of public policies if peo-
ple switch to riskier sexual practices. Thus, by neglecting to account for behav-
ioral changes, epidemiological studies may overstate the efficacy of some public
policies.
There is a large recent literature that studies HIV/AIDS prevention policies using
field experiments (see Padian et al. (2010) for a survey). The vast majority of field
experiments treat only a small segment of the population, but the insights arising
from these studies are very valuable and are used in the present study to calibrate
some parameters (such as in the circumcision experiment). While small-scale
field experiments establish the effect of a treatment on an individual, they neglect
general equilibrium effects. Public policy treatments affect not only individuals,
but also their partners, their partners’ partners, and so on. These effects may
accumulate in the population as a whole. Hence, small-scale field experiments
may understate the efficacy of some public policies, such as circumcision and the
treatment of STDs.
A caveat is in order before proceeding. Research using computational general
equilibrium models to assess the implications that interventions might have on
the spread of HIV/AIDS (or other diseases) is in its infancy. Overall, this re-
search program aims to develop tools to aid researchers and practitioners, and
highlights areas where further and more in-depth research should be conducted.
4Kremer and Morcom (1998) allow for different groups in the population to have different
mixing rates. This idea also features prominently here, but is applied to the type of sexual behav-
ior that a person purposely seeks.
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Some background information on sexual behavior and HIV/AIDS in Malawi is
now provided.
2 Families, Sexual Behavior, andHIV/AIDS inMalawi
The Republic of Malawi is a country in southeast Africa with a population of
14 million. Malawi suffers greatly from the HIV/AIDS epidemic. In 2004, 12%
of the adult population was infected.5 This was well above the average within
Sub-Saharan Africa (S.S.A.), which has an adult prevalence rate of about 7.2%
(Canning (2006)). However, it was below the HIV rate of the most affected coun-
tries, such as Botswana, with its adult prevalence rate of 37%. As in many other
countries, HIV in Malawi displays a hump-shaped profile over time. The HIV
prevalence rate peaked in 1999 and has been continuously falling since. The in-
cidence rate peaked earlier in 1994, with 21.8 infections per 1,000 healthy popu-
lation.
The principal mode of HIV transmission in Malawi is through heterosexual sex.
Mother-to-child transmissions account for about 10% of all new HIV infections.
This fact is ignored here, as most people born with HIV die before they reach
sexual maturity and therefore do not add to the propagation of HIV. As with
the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa, more than half of the HIV-infected population
in Malawi are women. By contrast two-thirds of the infected population in the
Western world are men. The HIV rate among adult women was 13% in 2004,
compared to 10% among men, suggesting important gender differences.
A rational behavior model of HIV only makes sense if people understand what
HIV is, are aware of how it gets transmitted, and know how to avoid it. This
seems largely to have been the case in Malawi since the 2000s. Almost 100%
of surveyed Malawians had heard of HIV or AIDS. About 57% of women and
75% of men correctly identified the use of condoms as a means to protect against
HIV infection. Finally, an overwhelming majority of adults in Malawi—74% for
women and 86% for men—knew where to get condoms. Further, Delavande
5Unless noted otherwise, information on HIV prevalence and patterns of sexual behavior are
from the 2004 Demographic and Health Survey’s (DHS) Final Report for Malawi.
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and Kohler (2009) document that people in Malawi are relatively good at assess-
ing their own probability of being infected with HIV. Prior to 2000, people were
less informed about the HIV transmission mechanism, and due to this ignorance
might not have switched to safer sexual practices. The analysis here examines
whether the diffusion of information about HIV could have contributed to the
observed decline in the Malawian HIV rate as people engaged in less risky sex-
ual behavior.
TreatingHIVwith antiretroviral drug therapy (ART) was not introduced until the
mid-2000s in Malawi. ART increased gradually from 3% of the infected in 2005
to 50% in 2014. The importance of ART will be examined in detail in this paper.
Further, about 20 percent of the male Malawian population were circumcised in
2004, a rate which rose only slightly (to 22%) in 2010. Circumcision seems largely
related to religion and ethnicity rather than health concerns, which explains its
relative stability over time.6 There has been a slight uptake more recently, likely
related to official HIV prevention interventions, so that by 2015, 28% of men were
circumcised.
Sexual behavior conducive to the spread of the disease is relatively common in
Malawi. Condoms were used by less than half of the population in their last
sexual act. It is also considered normal for unmarried people to change partners
often (Undie, Crichton, and Zulu (2007)). Divorce is relatively common, with
Reniers (2003) reporting that 45% of marriages end in divorce within 20 years.
Several other forms of risky behavior are abstracted from in the paper to keep
the model tractable. For example, concurrent multiple relationships, such as ex-
tramarital affairs or polygyny, are not modeled.
Just because people engage in risky sexual behavior does not necessarily imply
that they are uninformed or irrational: The decision could be due to a trade-off
between increased safety versus decreased pleasure. For example sex with a con-
dom is often compared to eating candy “while it’s in the wrapper” or a banana
with its peel (Undie, Crichton, and Zulu (2007)). Condom use within marriage is
also essentially non-existent in Malawi (Chimbiri (2007)). Furthermore, using a
condom in marriage may be interpreted as a signal of infidelity (Bracher, Santow,
6For example, inMalawi 93% ofMuslims are circumcised but only 8.6% of Catholics. Similarly,
82% of the Yao ethnicity are circumcised but only 2% of the Tumbuka. See 2004 DHS Final Report.
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and Watkins (2004)). Note that while using a condom lowers transmission risk
substantially, it does not decrease the risk to zero. Bracher, Santow, and Watkins
(2004) cite a study that finds that for new condoms, the average breakage rate is
4%; this rate jumps to 19% for condoms that are 7 years old.
Poulin (2007) documents that money and gift transfers in sexual partnerships are
part of courting practices in Malawi. In addition to an expression of love and
commitment, she argues that these transfers are a way of acquiring sex for men
andmeeting their financial needs for women. A gift might be in the form of sugar
or soap, but also in cash. Transfers are not made directly before or after sex (as
with prostitution), however; rather gift giving is an integral part of a relationship.
The model allows for such transfers between men and women.
3 Economic Environment
Imagine a world populated by males and females. Males and females desire
relationships with the opposite sex. There are two types of relationships, viz.,
short-term (“casual”) and long-term ones. Within a relationship individuals en-
gage in sex. Sex is risky because of the presence of the HIV/AIDS virus in society.
There are two types of sex, protected and unprotected. Protected sex offers a bet-
ter defense against the transmission of HIV/AIDS between partners. It provides
less enjoyment, though. Individuals interested in a short-term relationship must
decide what type of sex they desire. Put simply, they must weigh the extra mo-
mentary utility associated with unprotected sex against the increased odds of
contracting the HIV/AIDS virus. As motivated in Section 2, sex is always unpro-
tected in long-term relationships. Further, suppose that a person can only engage
in one relationship at a time.
Denote the utility from unprotected sex by u and the utility from protected sex
by p, with u > p > 0. The utility flow in a long-term relationship is u + l, where
l may be negative. A positive l can be interpreted as a preference for long-term
attachment, while as a negative l can be construed as taste for variety in partners.
Individuals also realize utility from the consumption of goods. Let this utility
be given by ln(w), where w is consumption (“wealth”). Each period a person re-
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ceives income in the amount y. There is no borrowing or saving in the economy.7
An individual discounts the future with a stochastic discount factor that takes
two values, viz., e◆ and e  with e◆ < e . There is a distribution across individuals
for the e◆s. Connected with each e◆ is a e . A person starts life with the low ratee◆ (dubbed “young”). This low factor reflects the impatience of youth, which re-
sults in a predilection for engaging in risky behavior.8 Then, in every period, a
person may switch permanently to the high factor (dubbed “old”) with probabil-
ity ⌘. Additionally, there is a probability   that an individual dies from natural
causes in a period. Thus, the effective discount factors are given by ◆ ⌘ e◆(1    )
and   ⌘ e (1   ). People differ in the (◆,  ) pair from which their discount factors
in youth and old age are drawn. Finally, a male individual may be circumcised
(denoted by c = 1) or not (c = 0). A circumcised male is less likely to contract the
HIV virus from his sexual partner. The values of c, ◆, and   differ across individ-
uals of a given gender. The set of fixed characteristics for a person is denoted by
x = (c, ◆,  ), called a person’s type.
People can search for partners in different markets.9 Depending on how much
they value a particular type of relationship, people choose their search effort by
picking the odds of finding a partner, which comes at a cost. At the beginning
of each period an unattached individual may search for a long-term partner. The
odds of finding a partner on the long-term market are denoted by ⇡l. The indi-
vidual picks these odds at an increasing cost in terms of lost utility. These search
costs are given by Cl(⇡l) = !l[⇡l/(1/2   ⇡l)]l+1, where l   0 and !l > 0. Ob-
serve that Cl(0) = 0 and Cl(1/2) = 1. A long-term relationship may break up
(at the end of) each period with exit probability ✏. If the person is unsuccessful
at finding a long-term mate, then they enter the short-term market, where they
can still engage in sexual behavior for this period. Note that an individual who
does not want a long-term relationship can set ⇡l = 0. If the person wants casual
sex, they can choose to search for protected and unprotected sex simultaneously.
Let ⇡p and ⇡u represent the odds of finding a partner in the protected and un-
7Magalha˜es and Santaeula`lia-Llopis (2018) provide evidence for the lack of savings inMalawi.
8The impatience of youth and resultant increase in risk-taking behavior has been documented
in many contexts. For example, Rolison et al. (2013) find that risk-taking attitudes drop smoothly
with age, especially in the health domain.
9The idea that people can rationally target their search behavior to particular markets is
present in many recent theoretical models, e.g., Eeckhout and Kircher (2010).
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protected markets for short-term relationships, which are choice variables. If she
prefers one type of sex over the other, she can choose the effort (and hence the
odds) accordingly. The cost of searching in each market is given by Cs(⇡p) and
Cs(⇡u), which have the same functional form as Cl(⇡l), but where the parame-
ters s and !s are allowed to differ from the long-term market. The total cost of
searching for a short-term partner will then be Cs(⇡p) + Cs(⇡u). An individual
cannot simultaneously draw a partner on both markets. Since Cs(1/2) = 1, the
odds are such that ⇡p + ⇡u < 1, and an individual will be abstinent with proba-
bility ⇡a ⌘ 1   ⇡p   ⇡u. Also, observe that individuals can choose abstinence by
picking ⇡p = ⇡u = 0.
The probabilistic nature of finding a partner in the three markets is meant to cap-
ture the randomness of meeting someone in everyday life. Finding a partner
is costly. The more you invest in it, the more likely you are to succeed. While
⇡l, ⇡p, and ⇡u represent the probabilities of an individual finding a partner in the
three markets, they also represent the fractions of people searching in each mar-
kets that will find a partner, given the large nature of the economy. Finally, this
randomness in the meeting structure helps to smooth out the equilibrium under
study because people who are currently of the same type will evolve differently
depending on the relationship they enter into.
Given the pervasive evidence on gift giving in the context of sexual relationships
(see Section 2), transfers are exchanged for sex. Associated with each market is
a transfer payment, z, that is made between the two partners. For the person
making the transfer, z will be positive, while it will be negative for the individual
receiving it. Think about the people receiving the transfers as supplying rela-
tionships on the market, and those paying transfers as demanding them. The
magnitude of this transfer is determined in equilibrium. It will depend upon the
demand and supply for a given type of relationship by each gender. This hinges
on the utility that each gender realizes from a partnership in the various markets
and the riskiness of participating in them.
People know their own health status  .10 A healthy individual has   = 1. An
10Greenwood et al. (2013) explored the evolution of beliefs about a person’s own likelihood of
being HIV positive in a world where individuals do not immediately observe their own health
status. People update their beliefs about being healthy in a Bayesian fashion, conditional on their
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individual with HIV infection and no antiretroviral therapy (ART) treatment has
  = 0. An infected individual who receives treatment has health status   = t. So,
  2 {0, 1, t}. All individuals are born healthy. If a non-circumcised individual has
sex with a partner with health status b , then the virus will be transmitted with
probability 1    (b ), which is trivially zero if the other individual is healthy.11
Further, 1    (t) < 1    (0), so that a treated individual is less likely to infect
others. Similarly, an individual of type   transmits the infection to a healthy
partner with probability 1   b ( ). The transmission probabilities can differ by
gender. Circumcised men are also less likely to contract the virus compared to
non-circumcised individuals. Denote this reduction in transmission probabilities
that circumcision provides by  (c), with  (1) =   < 1 and  (0) = 1. For women,
 (c) ⌘ 1; that is, circumcision is not a factor. These transmission probabilities are
also lower for protected sex than for unprotected sex. People only know their
own health status. While they cannot discern the health status of other individu-
als, they hold correct expectations, Rr(b ), about the fraction of potential partners
of each health status in each market, r = l, p, u. (As will be discussed later, for
women Rl(b ) will also depend on whether or not their partner is circumcised.)
If treatment is available, a currently infected untreated individual (  = 0) will
enter next period under ART with probability q. Once in treatment, the individ-
ual remains in treatment forever. So the probability of obtaining treatment in the
next period, conditional on current health status,  , can be summarized by the
function Q( ), where Q : {0, 1, t} ! {q, 0, 1}; i.e., a currently infected untreated
person obtains treatment in the next period with probability Q(0) = q; a healthy
person will not receive treatment, corresponding to Q(1) = 0; and a treated per-
son will still receive ART, implying Q(t) = 1.
The health status indicator refers to individuals in the early stages of the disease,
where it is assumed that their health status is not visible to other people and
neither income nor sexual activity is restricted. Individuals transit to the final
stages of AIDS (where they display symptoms) with probability ↵ , where ↵1 =
0 < ↵t < ↵0, since healthy individuals do not enter the final stage of the disease
past sexual history (and also on what they observe about their partners in long-term relation-
ships). An editor is thanked for suggesting the current simplification.
11The symbol ’ˆ’ denotes the characteristics of an individual’s partner.
11
and treatment prolongs a healthy existence. Assume that a person stricken with
final-stage HIV/AIDS symptoms engages in no further relationships. Let the
remaining lifetime utility for a person with final-stage HIV/AIDS symptoms be
represented by A. The probability that a person displaying symptoms dies is  2.
Since a person with HIV/AIDS symptoms engages in no further sexual activity,
 2 does not appear in the value functions. It is still relevant for computing the
average HIV/AIDS rate in society.
Note that in the framework there is attrition in the population each period due to
both natural death and to HIV/AIDS. This loss is replenished by an inflow each
period of newly-born females and males. Assume that µ(x) type-x individuals
are born at the beginning of each period. Recall that x denotes the set of per-
manent characteristics for an individual, namely c, ◆, and  . People also differ
by gender. Gender will be suppressed unless it is specifically needed, and then
it will be represented by the subscript g (for g = f,m) attached to a function or
variable.
Before proceeding on to the formal analysis some notations will be defined. An
individual will be indexed by his health status,   2 {0, 1, t}, his current discount
factor, d, drawn from his fixed sample space {◆,  }, and his exogenous type,
x = (c, ◆,  ). Let eV dr ( , x) denote the expected lifetime utility for a person with
health status  , realized discount factor d, and exogenous type x, who just found
a partner for a relationship of type r = a, l, p, u (abstinent, long-term, short-term
protected, and short-term unprotected). Similarly, V dr ( , x) will represent the ex-
pected lifetime utility for a person who is currently searching for but has not yet
found a partner in a type-r relationship (for r = l, s, where s denotes short-term).
The timing of events is summarized in Figure 5 in Appendix A. Attention will
now be directed toward the determination of the functions eV dr ( , x) and V dr ( , x).
The focus is on studying a stationary equilibrium.
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3.1 Short-term Relationships
3.1.1 Abstinence
The case of abstinence is the easiest to analyze. Recall that there are young and
old individuals who differ in their discount factor. Start with a type-x old person
(i.e., with discount factor  ) with health status  , who has failed to match on the
short-term sex markets. Thus, the person will be abstinent in the current period.
Note that the individual’s discount factor will remain high forever. The value
function for this person is given by
eV  a ( , x) = ln(y) + ↵  A+ (1  ↵ ) {Q( )V  l (t, x) + [1 Q( )]V  l ( , x)}, (1)
for   = 0, 1, t. The first term on the right-hand side covers the flow utility from
current consumption. The continuation value depends on whether the person
enters the final stages of the disease, which happens at rate ↵  and yields a dis-
counted continuation value of  A. With complementary probability, 1   ↵ , the
individual’s continuation value is the discounted expected value of either contin-
uing in their current state or of perhaps obtaining treatment. Healthy individuals
have a zero probability of entering the final stages of the disease or of obtaining
treatment, so their value function reduces simply to eV  a (1, x) = ln(y) +  V  l (1, x),
where the discount factor already incorporates other sources of death separate
from HIV/AIDS.
Next, consider the case of an abstinent young person (with discount factor ◆).
The discount factor may switch in the next period to the high value,  , with
probability ⌘, or remain at the low one, ◆, with probability 1   ⌘. Therefore,
the value functions for young individuals retain the same structure as (1) with
two modifications: first, the discount factor   needs to be replaced by ◆, and
second, the value function V  l ( , x) on the right-hand side has to be replaced
by the expected value ⌘V  l ( , x) + (1   ⌘)V ◆l ( , x). This difference between the
value functions for young and old individuals holds throughout the analysis.
Therefore, the focus is placed on defining the value functions for old individuals,
with the adjustments for young individuals summarized in Appendix C.1.
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3.1.2 Sexual Relationships
Now consider short-term relationships. Here, individuals have to take into ac-
count both the transfers in eachmarket as well as the distributions over the health
status of the partners they might encounter. Additionally, they also experience
the utility from sexual activity. For now, assume a person is already matched.
(The search behavior for an unmatched individual will be described at the end of
this section.)
Again, focus on an old individual with a high discount factor,  . If s = p, then
the person will use a condom and enjoy utility p from sex. If s = u, the individual
will enjoy u from unprotected sex. Define the indicator function I(s) to return a
value of 1 when s = p, and a value of 0, otherwise. Thus, the flow joy from a
short-term sexual relationship can be written as pI(s) + u[1   I(s)]. Apart from
this addition and the incorporation of the transfer zs in the short-term market,
the value function of infected individuals with   2 {0, t} looks similar to the one
for abstinence (1):
eV  s ( , x) = ln(y   zs) + pI(s) + u[1  I(s)] + ↵  A
+(1  ↵ ) {Q( )V  l (t, x) + [1 Q( )]V  l (0, x)}, (2)
for s = p, u. It comprises the utility from current consumption and sexual activity,
and the continuation value of either entering the last stages of the disease or
continuing as either an infected or treated individual.
The type of sexual activity in the current period that a healthy person (  = 1)
engages in affects the odds that they will enter next period infected with HIV.
First, the transmission risk of catching HIV/AIDS from an infected person dif-
fers across markets. Specifically, the transmission risk in the protected market is
lower than in the unprotected one. Second, the average level of healthiness in the
pool of participants in the two markets will differ. The fact that a person desires
a short-term sexual relationship that does not include condom use signals some-
thing about their past tendencies to engage in risky behavior. For instance, in the
market for protected sex, the fraction of healthy partners Rp(1) will presumably
be higher than the corresponding fraction Ru(1) in the market for unprotected
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sex. If the individual enters the next period newly infected with HIV, it will still
take at least one period for the symptoms of AIDS to appear. The value function
for a healthy individual who engages in sex of type s = u, p is then
eV  s (1, x) = ln(y   zs) + pI(s) + u[1  I(s)]
+
X
b Rs(b )[1   s(b )] (c) [qV  l (t, x) + (1  q)V  l (0, x)]
+{1 
X
b Rs(b )[1   s(b )] (c)} V  l (1, x). (3)
It entails the flow utility of consumption and sex and the continuation values.
The individual gets infected with probability
Pb Rs(b )[1   s(b )] (c). This infec-
tion probability takes into account the distribution in market s over health sta-
tus, as given by Rs(b ). For each health status it factors in the transmission risk,
[1  s(b )] (c), which depends onwhether the individual is circumcised. If the in-
dividual contracts the virus, they have the probability q of getting ART in the next
period and obtaining a treated person’s continuation utility,  V  l (t, x); while con-
tinuation as an untreated infected individual, which has value  V  l (0, x), arises
with probability 1 q. With probability {1 Pb Rs(b )[1  s(b )] (c)}, the individ-
ual remains healthy, in which case they obtain the continuation utility  V  l (1, x).
Finally, to be matched in the short-term market, a person must first decide how
much effort to expend searching in each market; that is, they must choose ⇡p and
⇡u. This is done in accordance with the following problem:
V ds ( , x) = max
0⇡du,⇡dp ,
⇡du+⇡
d
p<1
{⇡dp eV dp ( , x) + ⇡dueV du ( , x) + (1  ⇡dp   ⇡du)eV da ( , x) (4)
 C(⇡dp)  C(⇡du)}, for d = ◆,  ,
where with an slight abuse of notation the subscript s now simply denotes “short
term.” The value function V ds ( , x) gives the ex-ante value for a type-x individual,
with discount factor d and health status  , of entering the market for short-term
sex. The solution for the search effort is represented by the function ⇡ds = ⇧ds( , x),
for s = p, u.
15
3.2 Long-term Relationships
Imagine a person with a high discount factor,  , who is currently in a long-term
relationship. In a long-term relationship there are no choices to make: there are
no affairs, all sex is unprotected, and the partnership endures until some form of
exogenous breakup occurs. A long-term relationship may end due to an exoge-
nous divorce, the partner dying of natural causes, or the partner developing the
symptoms of HIV/AIDS.
To understand the value of a continuing relationship in which an individual of
health status   and circumcision type c is married to a partner of status b  and
circumcision type bc, it is important to derive the probability ⌥( 0, b 0| , b , c,bc) that
the pair enters next period together with status  0 and  ˆ0. A couple who is cur-
rently healthy will stay healthy, so that ⌥(1, 1|1, 1, c,bc) = 1 for all (c,bc). To illus-
trate a more complicated case, the following equation presents the probability of
a transition to a state in the next period where the individual is infected and the
partner is treated, from a state in this period where the individual is healthy and
the partner is infected or treated (b  = 0, t):
⌥(0, t|1, b , c,bc) = [1   u(b )] (c)(1  q)Q(b ). (5)
The first term captures the chance that the individual becomes infected [1  
 u(b )] (c). The second and third terms capture the probabilities that the individ-
ual is not treated, 1  q, but the partner is, Q(b ). All other transition probabilities
are described in Appendix C.2.
Given these transition probabilities, consider an individual of health status  who
starts the period matched to a partner of health status b  and circumcision typebc. Focus on a high-discount-factor individual for illustration. His continuation
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utility is
eV  l ( , b ,bc, x) = ln(y   zl) + u+ l + ↵  A
+(1  ↵ )(1  ✏)(1   )(1  ↵b ) 
X
 0,b 0
⌥( 0, b 0| , b , c,bc)eV  l ( 0, b 0,bc, x)
+(1  ↵ )[1  (1  ✏)(1   )(1  ↵b )] 
X
 0,b 0
⌥( 0, b 0| , b , c,bc)V  l ( 0, x).
(6)
The first three terms on the first line capture the flow utility from consumption
and sex in long-term relationships. Additionally, the individual develops final
stage symptoms with probability ↵ , which is captured by the last term in the
first line. With complementary probability, 1   ↵ , the individual remains either
married (second line) or becomes single (third line). The marriage will persist if
there is no exogenous breakup (chance 1   ✏), the partner does not die of natu-
ral causes (chance 1    ), and the partner does not develop symptoms (chance
1 ↵b ). In this case the individual obtains the continuation value connected with
marriage,   eV  l ( 0, b 0,bc, x), taking into account the transition probability of health
status. With complementary probability, the marriage breaks up and the individ-
ual carries his new status as a single into the long-term market with associated
continuation value,  V  l ( 0, x).
Since individuals do not know their partner’s health status, the value of being
matched in the long-term market for an individual with discount factor d = ◆,  
and health status   = 0, 1, t is given by the weighted average of possible partners
in the long-term market:
eV dl ( , x) =Xb ,bcRl(b ,bc)eV dl ( , b ,bc, x). (7)
Note that, in long-term relationships, unlike short-term relations, the relevant
fraction Rl(b ,bc) also depends on the circumcision type of the potential partner.
This is so because the circumcision type of the spouse matters for the evolution
of the marriage, as can be seen from the probabilities given in Appendix C.2.12
12This is only relevant for women as only men are circumcised; i.e., in the model a man cannot
have a circumcised mate.
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The value of searching in the long-term market for a status/type-( , x) person
with discount factor d is given by
V dl ( , x) = max
⇡dl
[⇡dl eV dl ( , x) + (1  ⇡dl )V ds ( , x)  C(⇡l)], (8)
for d = ◆,   and   = 0, 1, t. The solution for the search effort, ⇡dl , is represented by
the function ⇡dl = ⇧dl ( , x).
3.3 Stationary Equilibrium
The analysis focuses on a steady-state competitive equilibriumwhere the number
of people of a particular gender, discount factor, permanent type, and treatment
status is constant through time. From the above dynamic programming prob-
lems, time-invariant decision rules arise for search in each of the three markets.
By using these decision rules, the steady-state type distribution can be formu-
lated.13 In the equilibrium modeled, beliefs about the prevalence rates in each
market are rational and thereby consistent with the time-invariant decision rules
and steady-state type distribution. Decision rules are optimal given beliefs and
prices. Finally, prices are market clearing, so that the number of men who form a
sexual relationship in a given market equals the number of women who form a
relationship in that market. Refer to Appendix C.3 for an exact definition of the
equilibrium and for more information on its formulation.
4 Calibration
To address the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Malawi, the model is analyzed numer-
ically. A benchmark simulation is constructed that displays features that are
broadly consistent with the Malawian case. Interpret a model period as last-
ing one quarter. The calibration is conducted in three steps. First, parameters
with direct data analogs are assigned values from the literature. In particular,
all parameters relating directly to the biology of the disease are chosen this way.
13Appendix C.4 outlines how to derive the steady-state type distributions.
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Second, the remaining parameters are selected tomatch some stylized facts about
the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Malawi. The stylized facts are based mostly on micro
data from the 2004 Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) that was conducted
in Malawi. Third, the model’s predictions are compared (in Sections 5 and 6 and
Appendix E) to the Malawian data along several non-targeted dimensions.
4.1 Parameters Based on Direct Evidence
The most important parameter values for the simulation are those concerning
HIV/AIDS. Fortunately, for the most part these can be taken from the medical
literature. The transmission risk for one-time male unprotected sex is taken to
be 4.5 per 1,000 encounters. This number falls in the range of estimates reported
by a variety of studies.14 Since couples on average have sex 9 times a month, as
reported in Gray et al. (2001), this translates into a quarterly non-transmission
risk of  mu = 0.879.15 The transmission risk when condoms are used is obviously
lower, but protection is far from perfect (Bracher, Santow, and Watkins (2004)).
Select  mp = 0.96, corresponding to a 67% efficacy rate, which is in line withWeller
(1993), who conducted a meta-analysis of condom efficacy. Assume that circum-
cised men are 60% less likely to contract the HIV/AIDS virus and set   = 0.4 ac-
cordingly. This accords with the improvements reported by Auvert et al. (2005),
Bailey et al. (2007), and Gray et al. (2007). Set the fraction of circumcised men
to 20% (DHS Final Report, 2004). Further, for physiological and anatomical rea-
sons, and in accord with the medical evidence, women are assumed to have a
higher risk of contracting HIV than men. Nicolosi et al. (1994) report a risk that
is 2.3 times higher for women.16 However, the range of estimates is wide. At
one extreme, Gray et al. (2001) find no statistically significant difference between
transmission rates by gender. At the other extreme, Padian, Shiboski, and Jewell
(1991) calculate a factor as high as 20. Assuming that women are 75%more likely
to get infected implies a one-time risk of 7.87 per 1,000 encounters for unpro-
14For example, Baeten et al. (2005) report a transmission risk of 6 per 1,000. A lower number
of 1.1 per 1,000 for Uganda is documented by Gray et al. (2001); however, free condoms were
distributed as part of the study.
15This quarterly rate also is similar in magnitude to the per-partnership transmission rates for
Sub-Saharan Africa reported in Oster (2005) and the correction appendix.
16Oster (2005) also reports a factor of two in hermeasures of per-partnership transmission rates.
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tected sex. This delivers a quarterly non-transmission rate of  fu = 0.787. Using
the same gender gap for protected sex yields  fp = 0.929.
The average time from infection to the outbreak of symptoms is equal to 10 years
(DHS Final Report, 2004). Therefore, let ↵ = 0.025; i.e., 40 quarters. The average
time from the outbreak of symptoms to death is 2 years (DHS Final Report, 2004).
Thus, set  2 = 0.125; i.e., 8 quarters.
Some other parameter values can also be pinned down using a priori informa-
tion. Set the quarterly divorce hazard equal to ✏ = 0.03. Bracher, Santow, and
Watkins (2004) report that 26.4% of all marriages inMalawi end in divorce within
the first five years. Assuming a constant annual divorce hazard, this would im-
ply a quarterly risk of 1.56%. A rate twice this number is used: First, polygyny
is fairly common in Malawi, from which the analysis abstracts. Second, extra-
marital affairs are relatively common as well. Therefore, interpret, for example, a
10-year marriage with one affair as two separate long-term relationships with a
third casual one in between.17
The quarterly (non-HIV related) death hazard is taken to be   = 0.006. A study
conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau (2004) reports a life expectancy without
HIV of 56.3 years for Malawi. Since the model starts at age 15, the quarterly
death hazard is selected to match a life expectancy of 41.3 years. Malawi is a
very poor country. Set y = $320 (U.S.), which corresponds roughly to quarterly
GDP per working age population in 2001 (only about half the population is of
working age in Malawi). Table I summarizes the preceding paragraphs by listing
all parameters that are set a priori.
4.2 Parameters Chosen to Match Data Moments
The remaining parameters have no clear data analogs. For example, the utilities
from the different types of sexual relationships are free parameters. The values
for these parameters are picked to match several stylized facts related to sex,
marriage, and HIV/AIDS in Malawi.
17Greenwood et al. (2017) explore what happens to equilibrium outcomes when the risk of
divorce is lower.
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Table I: PARAMETERS CHOSEN OUTSIDE THE MODEL
Parameter Value Interpretation
 mu 0.879 12.1% quarterly transmission risk, unprotected sex, uncircumcised men
 mp 0.96 4% quarterly transmission risk, protected sex, uncircumcised men
  0.4 Circumcised men are 60% less likely to contract HIV
 fu 0.787 21.3% quarterly transmission risk, unprotected sex, women
 fp 0.929 7.1% quarterly transmission risk, protected sex, women
↵ 0.025 10 years from infection to symptoms
  0.006 6% quarterly death risk
 2 0.125 2 years from symptoms to death
✏ 0.03 3% quarterly divorce hazard
y 320 Quarterly income
Table II: CALIBRATED PARAMETERS
Interpretation Parameter value
Flow utility unprotected sex u = 7.8
Flow utility protected sex p = 1.4
Flow utility long-term sex l =  4.8
Discount factor, min and max support e min = 0.969, e max = 0.9999
Ratio discount factors, young vs. old ◆change = 0.874
Value of life with AIDS A = 5.8
Prob. of switch to high discount factor ⌘ = 0.116
Search cost parameters !s = 0.44,!l = 17.5, = 0.115
As specified above, the only exogenous heterogeneity (in addition to the dif-
ference in transmission risks for circumcised and uncircumcised males and the
difference in transmission risks across genders) is the degree of patience people
have. Recall thate◆ and e  denote the discount factors for the young and old. These
are “pure” discount factors; i.e., net of mortality risk.18 Suppose that e  varies
across individuals according to a uniform distribution with support [e min, e max].
Moreover, assume the ratio of discount factors when young and old is always
given by the same value ◆change = e◆/e  < 1. Thus, there are 11 free parameters: p,
u, `, !s, !l, , A, ⌘, e min, e max, and ◆change. See Table II for a summary. To discipline
the choice of the parameters, 11 data moments are targeted. Table III presents the
data moments and shows how well the benchmark model matches them.19
18That is,   ⌘ e (1   ) and ◆ ⌘ e◆(1   ).
19All data sources for the tables and figures are discussed in Appendix B.
21
The upshot of the analysis is that the benchmark simulation matches these key
features of theMalawianHIV/AIDS epidemic pretty well.20 To beginwith, as can
be seen from Table III, the HIV/AIDS prevalence rate predicted by the model
is 10.3%, close to the 11.8% in the data. Moreover, the benchmark simulation
captures the gender difference in HIV/AIDS infection rates, with females expe-
riencing a rate that is 3.5 percentage points higher than that for males (12.1%
versus 8.6%). The model also captures well the HIV incidence rate (which was
not specifically targeted). In the model 11.7 per 1,000 healthy people are newly
infected every year, compared to 11.1 in the data.
In addition tomatchingmoments onHIV/AIDS prevalence, the benchmarkmodel
also mimics some other moments relevant for sexual activity quite well. In the
model, casual or short-term sex represents a small fraction of all sexual encoun-
ters: 16%, close to the 18% of sex that occurs outside of a union that is reported
in the data. For those who engage in casual sex, the model predicts that 33% use
a condom. This is less than the 39% seen in the data, but is still close. In fact,
as people have been found to overstate the amount of protected sex they have
(Allen et al. (2003)), these two numbers may be closer in reality than first meets
the eye. The next row in Table III reports the fraction of singles who had casual
sex in the last year. These statistics are different from the fraction of all sexual
activity that is casual because (all) married people have sex while some singles
are abstinent. Singles in the model have a little more casual sex than their real-
life counterparts (54 versus 47%). Finally, the fraction of the population that dies
from HIV/AIDS is comparable across model and data (25 versus 29%).
The fraction of singles in the entire population is 48% in the model, somewhat
higher than the 33% observed in the data, which is partially due to the modeling
choice to break up marriages more frequently than in the data to account for
extramarital affairs. The model also captures some of the gender differences in
the timing of marriage. Women marry much earlier than men—in the data, 90%
of women are married by age 22, whereas only 58% of men are married by this
age. The corresponding numbers in the model are 63% and 57%. In the model,
women marry earlier than men due to the higher female infection risk, which
20Appendix F provides sensitivity analysis for these estimated parameters. Both benchmark
moments and the response to some policy experiments (discussed in Section 5) are analyzed.
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Table III: TARGETED MOMENTS
Observation Data Model
HIV/AIDS prevalence rate, % 11.8 10.3
—Males 10 8.6
—Females 13 12.1
Sex that is casual, % (of all) 18 16
Condom use for casual sex, % 39 33
Singles that had casual sex in past year, % 47 54
Singles, % 33 48
Married by age 22, %
—Males 58 57
—Females 90 63
Married by age 50, %
—Males 100 98
—Females 100 98
Deaths related to HIV, % 29 25
makes the safety of marriage more attractive for women compared to men. In
reality, HIV risk is only one reason why women marry earlier than men; other
reasons may include the biological clock, polygyny, and the fear of pregnancy.
By age 50 almost everyone is married, both in the data and model.
In Section 5 the model’s predictions are compared with cross-country data on the
relationship betweenHIV andmale circumcision. Additionally, in Section 6 time-
series data for Malawi are confronted with a version of the model with a richer
information structure regarding knowledge about HIV. Last, the framework also
captures surprisingly well some non-targeted life-cycle moments—see Appendix
E. This all provides additional validity checks on the calibration.
5 Policy Experiments
The model is now ready to explore the effectiveness of various policies intended
to curb the spread of HIV/AIDS. This section investigates four specific policies:
male circumcision, ART, better condoms, and the treatment of other STDs. The
first two policies have been at the forefront of the policy discussion.
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In addition to studying the effectiveness of the various policies in the full model,
two alternative versions of the model are simulated: (i) small-scale field exper-
iments and (ii) epidemiological experiments. The synthetic small-scale field ex-
periment is a partial equilibrium version of the general equilibrium one. It as-
sumes that only a small fraction of the population is treated and changes their
behavior, but that this fraction interacts in equilibrium with everyone else at the
preexisting equilibrium prices and infection rates. The synthetic epidemiological
experiment assumes that people make no behavioral adjustments. It therefore
uses the policy functions from the benchmark calibration in conjunction with the
new exogenous transmission probabilities.
Comparing the effectiveness of policies across the three versions of the model can
be thought of in two ways. First, they can be viewed as thought experiments. A
comparison of the small-scale field experiment with the benchmarkmodel exper-
iment shows the importance of general equilibrium effects, while a comparison
of the epidemiological experiment with the benchmark model experiment illus-
trates the significance of behavioral responses. Second, they give insights into the
extent to which actual small-scale field experiments and epidemiological studies
might (or might not) generate reliable policy advice.
5.1 Male Circumcision and HIV
A policy intervention that has received significant recent attention is male cir-
cumcision. UNAIDS lists circumcision as one of five prevention pillars in their
2016 report (UNAIDS 2016). Similarly, the World Health Organization has been
promoting voluntary male circumcision as a prevention tool (World Health Or-
ganization 2016).
To what extent does cross-country variation in circumcision explain the observed
differences in HIV prevalence and incidence rates across countries? While cir-
cumcision has been advocated recently as a medical policy, it has not yet seen
large-scale implementation. Thus, existing cross-country differences in circumci-
sion rates are unrelated to HIV and are due instead to cultural reasons. Data from
32 Sub-Saharan African countries are used to explore the empirical relationship
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Table IV: HIV AND CIRCUMCISION ACROSS COUNTRIES—REGRESSIONS
Dep. variable: HIV prevalence rate Dep. variable: HIV incidence rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
circumcision -0.1122⇤⇤⇤ -0.0765⇤⇤ -0.0796⇤⇤ -0.064 -9.840⇤⇤ -4.972 -6.191 -7.339
(0.0292) (0.0327) (0.0337) (0.0396) (3.7864) (4.1067) (4.1542) (4.4920)
Log GDP p.c. 0.0314⇤⇤⇤ 0.0293⇤⇤⇤ 0.0288⇤⇤⇤ 0.0296⇤⇤⇤ 3.87⇤⇤⇤ 3.73⇤⇤⇤ 3.43⇤⇤⇤ 2.459⇤⇤
(0.0086) (0.0083) (0.0085) (0.0096) (1.2242) (1.1111) (1.1190) (1.0833)
ART 0.0816 0.104⇤⇤ 0.105⇤ 0.098 5.63 8.71 9.05 6.266
(0.0517) (0.0504) (0.0512) (0.0621) (6.5284) (6.2264) (6.1410) (7.1822)
syphilis 0.0025 0.0029 0.003 0.0045 0.359 0.42 0.526 0.711
(0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0029) (0.0046) (0.3549) (0.3442) (0.3487) (0.5122)
Muslim -0.002 -0.00056 -0.0012 -0.026 -0.128 -0.207⇤
(0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0405) (0.0886) (0.1105)
Christian -0.00039 -0.00065 -0.121 -0.171⇤
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0935) (0.0869)
condom price -0.268⇤ -17.5
(0.1297) (14.5590)
R2 0.72 0.73 0.74 0.79 0.61 0.65 0.67 0.71
N 32 31 31 23 30 29 29 22
⇤⇤⇤ denotes significance at the 1% level, ⇤⇤ at the 5% level, and ⇤ at the 10% level. Standard errors are in parentheses.
between HIV and circumcision.21 Table IV reports some regression analysis, con-
trolling for various potentially confounding factors such as GDP, ART, religion,
and the price of condoms.
Now contemplate performing the analogous exercise in the model. In other
words, vary the fraction of men who are circumcised in the model and compute
the implied equilibrium HIV prevalence and incidence rates. Start with preva-
lence. There is an almost linear relationship with a slope of -0.05. In other words,
for each 10 percentage point increase in circumcision, the HIV prevalence rate
declines by about half a percent. This is quite similar in magnitude to the coeffi-
cient from the regressions. Controlling for observables, regression (4) in Table IV
shows a coefficient of -0.064. Since the prevalence rate is a stock variable, another
way is to compare the incidence of HIV. In the model, the relationship between
HIV incidence and circumcision rates yields a coefficient of -6.389. Looking at
regressions (5) to (8) in Table IV, the coefficients estimated in the data are close to
21See Appendix B for details on this data.
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Table V: CIRCUMCISION
B.M. (20% circ.) 100% circ. Epidem.
Males
not circ. circ.
HIV prevalence, % 10.3 5.6 4.3
—Males 8.6 8.75 8.0 3.8 4.1
—Females 12.1 7.6 4.6
Sex that is casual (males), % 16 14 22 29 –
Condom use for casual sex (males), % 33 35 27 22 –
Single men, % 50 49 53 59 –
Casual sex in past year, single men, % 21 19 28 31 –
Price—protected -6.5 – – 53 –
Price—unprotected 278 – – 309 –
Price—long term 125 – – 161 –
the model counterpart. Thus, the model quite closely replicates the cross-country
relationship between HIV and circumcision. Since cross-country data was not
used in the calibration, this can be seen as an external validation of the model.
So is male circumcision a promising policy that should be promoted? Probably
yes.22 Table V shows that scaling circumcision up from the current 20% to 100%
would cut the HIV rate by almost half—from 10.3 to 5.6%. This works despite
significant behavioral adjustments by men. The model suggests that men would
engage in more risky behavior along all dimensions: less marriage, decreased
condom use, and more sex.23 The equilibrium model also shows a sizable posi-
tive effect for women: The prevalence rate among women falls from 12.1 to 7.6%.
This is worth emphasizing, as the effect on women is theoretically unclear. Wo-
men do not directly benefit from circumcision as the male-to-female transmission
rate does not change. Moreover, the increased risky behavior of their partners
would, all else equal, lead to more HIV among women. Yet, the model shows
that women benefit through the equilibrium effects. Thus, the lower female-to-
male transmission rate also leads to a decline in the female prevalence rate.
22This ignores any potential negative physiological and psychological side effects. In a Malaw-
ian field experiment, Chinkhumba, Godlonton, and Thornton (2014) find important barriers to
male circumcision based on cultural norms and fear of pain.
23This is in line with cross-sectional studies showing that circumcised men engage in more
risky sexual behavior along several dimensions, such as Bailey, Neema, and Othieno (1999).
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The conclusion that circumcision is an effective policy is in line with findings
in field experiments. Padian et al. (2010) compare the effects of 36 randomized
controlled trials (RCTs) in the context of HIV. Only six RCTs delivered definitive
results on HIV—three of which were circumcision RCTs. But what about the size
of the effect? In the benchmark model, the behavior of circumcised men corre-
sponds to the treated group in a small field experiment, while non-circumcised
men constitute the control group. So, in Table V compare the statistics for non-
circumcised with circumcised men in the benchmark model. Clearly, in line with
RCTs, the treated men in the model have a lower HIV rate. However, the ef-
fect is small (8 versus 8.75%). This is due to the missing equilibrium effects and
behavioral responses among the circumcised that crowd out some of the gains
from the intervention. The simulation suggests that circumcised men have 50%
more casual sex, use condoms about 25% less, and are slightly more likely to be
unmarried. The result that circumcised men engage in more risky behavior is in
line with the empirical findings from RCTs. Bailey et al. (2007) find that unpro-
tected sex fell much less for the newly circumcised relative to the control group.24
Similarly, Auvert et al. (2005) find a statistically significant increase in the num-
ber of partners for the circumcised men. In a unique long-run follow-up after
a circumcision RCT with teenagers, Kim et al. (2018) find evidence of risk com-
pensation four years after the intervention. Those treated (i.e., being offered free
circumcision) have a higher incidence of other STDs and are less likely to believe
that they should use a condom during a casual sexual encounter.
A simple extrapolation from such a field experiment might suggest that circum-
cision is useful, but with expected small effects. Yet, the experiments show when
circumcising the entire male population, powerful equilibrium effects kick in.
The male HIV rate falls by more than half (from 8.6 to 3.8%). This is despite even
larger behavioral responses in equilibrium. Because female-to-male transmission
rates are lower, fewer men get infected, given sexual behavior. Since fewer men
are infected fewer women get infected, given sexual behavior. And so on.
24Note that most circumcision RCTs were combinedwith counseling sessions for both the treat-
ment and control group. Since this increased awareness likely led to more cautious sexual behav-
ior, the relevant thing to look at is behavioral change in the treatment relative to the control group,
rather than the absolute change. Section 6 discusses the impact of increased awareness about the
HIV transmission mechanism.
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The equilibrium effect would of course also be present in epidemiological stud-
ies. The epidemiological model version is reported in the last column of the table.
Not surprisingly, the epidemiological experiment exaggerates the beneficial im-
pact of the policy, as it completely ignores the additional risk-taking behavior.
This potential overstatement of effects is a concern of the epidemiological liter-
ature. Williams et al. (2006) report large positive effects of circumcision in Sub-
Saharan Africa, but add a cautionary note remarking that increases in risk-taking
may reduce some of the benefits of this policy. The study concludes by asserting
that population-level studies of male circumcision are needed, a call echoed by
De Walque (2012). Since population-level studies are expensive and difficult to
implement, the equilibrium model offers a potentially promising alternative.
5.2 Was ART Successful in Reducing HIV?
A second policy that has gained widespread attention is the introduction of ART.
While initially invented as a treatment for sick people, it is now also believed to
have a preventive component. ART lowers the viral load and makes the person
taking the drugs feel healthier, live longer, and be less likely to pass the virus
on. Since the existence of ART makes life with HIV more tolerable, this may lead
healthy-feeling infected people to engage in riskier behavior. Moreover, since
HIV-infected people onART live longer, they havemore time to pass the virus on.
Thus, the net effect of ART on HIV prevalence is not obvious. Previous research,
based on different methodologies, finds a wide range of effects. The predicted
long-run effects range from the complete eradication of HIV to an increase in the
prevalence rate. Much of the medical literature seems convinced of the effective-
ness of the policy (e.g. Cohen et al. (2011)). Yet, for example, Lakdawalla, Sood,
and Goldman (2006) show empirically that ART has led to an increase in HIV in
the United States. Wilson (2012) provides a survey of the empirical studies and
warns that widespread enthusiasm for ART as prevention may be misguided,
since expected outcomes are currently mostly based on clinical trials alone that
are not informative for what would happen if the entire population was treated.
In Malawi, ART was introduced in 2005. Figure 1a shows that from 2004 to 2014,
the fraction of infected people on ART increased from essentially zero to 50%.
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At the same time, HIV was declining.25 The Malawian government seems to
have concluded that the decline was due to the successful ART scale-up.26 How-
ever, simple inspection of the two time series in Figure 1a makes it clear that
ART cannot be the whole story. The HIV decline started in 2000, 5 years prior to
the introduction of ART. Anticipation effects would go in the other direction—as
anticipating ART should make people behave in a riskier fashion without expe-
riencing the benefits of the lower transmission risk. It is of course possible that
the introduction of ART did contribute to the HIV decline in the later years. The
model can be used to assess (and quantify) this hypothesis.
ART is modeled as a decline in the (out-going) transmission rate. Assume a re-
duction in infectivity by two-thirds, which is within the range of empirical esti-
mates.27 Specifically, the quarterly transmission risk for unprotected sex declines
from 0.21 to 0.07 for females having sex with someone on ART, and from 0.12 to
0.04 for males.28 The reducedmortality (and accordingly increased quality of life)
is modeled as a longer life without symptoms. This means that infected people
on ART live longer, but also enjoy a better life after infection (relative to those not
on drugs). Specifically, reduce ↵, the probability of symptoms breaking out, from
0.025 to 0.0125. Since symptoms are quickly followed by death, this means that
mortality is essentially reduced by 50%, which is in line with the evidence.29
In the model, infected people are treated randomly. The probability of being
selected for ART is q. Since treatment is an absorbing state, q%newly treated each
period cumulates to a substantially higher percentage of the infected on ART.
25The time-series data for the HIV prevalence rate comes from UNAIDS and is estimated
largely based on information collected at antenatal clinics. The UNAIDS 2004 HIV rate for
Malawi is 13.5% which is substantially higher than the prevalence rate in the DHS, reported
in Table III. Since the DHS is a nationally representative survey, it is the more reliable source.
However, UNAIDS provides the only consistent time-series data.
26“Malawi’s rapid and successful Antiretroviral Therapy scale-up from 2004 to 2014 has crit-
ically influenced the trajectory of the HIV epidemic . . . ,” see p.2 in the Malawi AIDS Response
Progress Report 2015, Government of Malawi.
27While the estimates cover a wide range, the number used is close to Porco et al. (2004), who
found a decline of 60%.
28This corresponds to an increase in   from 0.787 to 0.929 for females and from 0.879 to 0.96
males. The numbers for protected sex and for circumcised men are adjusted accordingly when
having sex with a treated individual.
29One study specifically pertaining to Malawi is Lowrance et al. (2007). Friedman (2018) also
feeds in a 50% reduction in mortality for treated individuals in her simulation study.
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Figure 1: ART in Malawi
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(b) ART in the Model
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Envisage the following exercise: increase q such that the equilibrium fraction of
infected on ART goes up in line with the data. The model then gives, at various
levels of treatment, the long-term HIV rate. Since the model compares steady
states (i.e., ignores transitional dynamics), this exercise will give an upper bound
on the fraction of the HIV decline due to ART.
The dashed line in Figure 1a displays the simulation results. The surprising an-
swer is that hardly any of the HIV decline can be attributed to the introduction
of ART. In other words, the negative effects (increased risk-taking, longer time
to infect others) of the policy dominate the positive effects (from the lower trans-
mission rates making sex safer). Now, should one conclude from this that ART is
not an effective policy to curb HIV? Probably not. The experiments show that the
relative importance of the positive versus negative effects changes with the ART
rate. Figure 1b shows that higher levels of treatment are actually quite effective.
Once more than 50% of the infected are treated, the preventive effect dominates.
Thus, going forward, a further expansion of ART appears promising.30
To better understand the nonmonotonicity, also consult Table VI. When a third
30The point that ART may be beneficial only once a large enough fraction of the infected is
treated is also emphasized in Friedman (2018), who simulates a one-gender model with only one
margin of risky behavior.
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of the infected are treated, people realize they may have a reasonable chance of
getting treatment if they contract HIV, and accordingly take fewer precautions.
Condom use goes down by six percentage points, casual sex rises from 54 to
63%, and more people become single. When 80% of the infected are treated, the
behavioral adjustments are even more dramatic. The increase in risk-taking is in
line with the empirical findings. Most evidence to date comes from developed
countries.31 However, there is some limited evidence from African countries as
well. Identifying the behavioral response to ART is notoriously difficult. Clearly
a randomized controlled trial to assess the effect on the uninfected is difficult
to conceive.32 De Walque, Kazianga, and Over (2012) find a large increase in
self-reported risky sexual activity in response to ART in Mozambique, both in
terms of more casual sex and less condom use. Similarly, Cohen et al. (2009)
find increased risk-taking behavior in men who have stronger beliefs in the effec-
tiveness of ART compared to those with more skeptical beliefs. Friedman (2018)
uses a difference-in-difference strategy based on proximity to an ART provider
in Kenya and discovers an increase in self-reported risky behavior of about 40%,
both in terms of the incidence of casual sex and condom use. When using a
biomarker (pregnancy) the effect is even larger, at about 80%.
Behavioral adjustments alone would lead to a large increase in the HIV rate, as
the synthetic field experiment (which predicts an increase in the HIV rate to
16.7%) shows. However, these effects are mitigated in equilibrium by the fact
that the treated interact with everyone else. In the general equilibrium experi-
ment where 80% of the population is treated, sex in general is safer, which leads
to a lower aggregate prevalence rate. In the field experiment, people realize that
once they get sick they have a 80% chance of getting treated eventually (7.5%
per period) but they still have sex with the general population; in essence, none
of their potential partners is treated. So their behavioral adjustments lead to a
very high HIV rate of 16.7%, with no offsetting effect created by a lower chance
of catching the virus. By contrast, by completely ignoring the behavioral ad-
31For example, see Crepaz, Hart, and Marks (2004) for a meta-analysis of 25 studies in the
United States, Europe, and Australia.
32In the synthetic field experiment it is easy to “treat” some uninfected by changing their q; i.e.,
the probability that they would get treated with ART should they get sick. Implementing this
in reality would require essentially an information treatment, where some people are informed
about increased access to ART while others are not.
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Table VI: ART
Benchmark G. E. G. E. Small Field Epidem.
q=0.01 q=0.075
Fraction on ART, % none 33 80 80 80
HIV prevalence, % 10.3 11.3 8.1 16.7 2.5
Casual sex, % (of all) 15.7 20.5 42 22 —
Casual sex with condom, % 33 27 24 30 —
Singles who have casual sex, % 54 63 84 62 —
Single men, % 50 53 67 54 —
Single women, % 46 49 65 51 —
Price—protected -6.5 7.8 25 — —
Price—unprotected 279 285 259 — —
Price—long term 125 126 100 — —
justments in the epidemiological experiment, the opposite mistake occurs. The
epidemiological version predicts a massive HIV decline to a prevalence rate of
only 2.5%. In other words, the behavioral and equilibrium effects go in oppo-
site directions, and which of them dominates depends on the fraction of people
treated. A too-cautious attempt may backfire.
5.3 Better Condoms
Suppose one could design more pleasurable condoms (or perhaps raise the psy-
chic pleasure of sex with a condom by reducing stigmatization through publicity
campaigns).33 Would this be desirable? The effect of more pleasurable condoms
is displayed in Figure 2, where starting from the benchmark, utility from sex with
condoms is increased until it reaches the same period utility as unprotected sex.
It turns out that the HIV rate displays a nonmonotonic pattern when increasing
pleasure from condoms, p. The reason that increasing the utility from protected
sex does not always lead to a lower prevalence rate is that single life becomes
more attractive. So, even though condom usage increases, there are more singles
33While this might seem somewhat far-fetched, note that UNAIDS lists exactly such a policy in
their recent report: “Develop new approaches to increase condom use and to enhance the positive
perception of condoms among the various populations in need,” p. 30 in UNAIDS (2016). Con-
cerns about the acceptability of condoms have long been discussed in the literature; see Section
2.
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Figure 2: Better Condoms
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in total and they engage in both protected and unprotected sex.
Table VII gives the example of quadrupling condom pleasure from 1.4 to 5.5. In
response, condom use increases tremendously, almost doubling from 33 to 59%.
However, the percentage of singles also substantially increases (from 48 to 62%).
Moreover, the percentage of singles who engage in short-term sex goes up from
54 to 66%. These two forces (safer sex versus more sex) push the prevalence
rate in opposite directions. In the example of quadrupling pleasure, the latter
force dominates, so that the overall HIV rate goes up by about 60% (from 10.3
to 15.8%). The HIV rate declines, though, when the pleasure from condoms is
pushed up further from 5.5 to 7.5, at which point protected and unprotected sex
give almost equal utility. This experiment highlights the potential of some poli-
cies to backfire and actually increase the overall prevalence rate. These effects
can be quantitatively quite important: in the experiment, the HIV rate goes up
by 40% as the utility gap between protected and unprotected sex disappears.
Implementing this particular policy as a field experiment gives surprising re-
sults. Depending on the exact increase in pleasure, the synthetic field experiment
effects are larger or smaller than the general equilibrium effects—see Table VII.
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Table VII: BETTER CONDOMS
Benchmark G. E. Small Field G. E. Small Field
p 1.4 5.5 (Better) 7.5 (Better still)
p/u 0.18 0.70 0.97
HIV prevalence, % 10.3 15.8 15.6 14.0 18.8
Casual sex, % (of all) 15.7 34 31 32 41
Casual sex with condom, % 33.0 59 57 62 61
Singles who have casual sex, % 54.0 66 73 73 78
Single men, % 50 64 60 62 70
Single women, % 46 60 51 58 56
Price—protected -6.5 246 – 260 –
Price—unprotected 279 264 – 244 –
Price—long term 125 134 – 138 –
Consider the experiment where the pleasure from sex with condoms is increased
from 1.4 to 5.5. The increase in the aggregate HIV rate in the general equilib-
rium experiment is slightly larger than the increase in an individual’s odds of
catching HIV in the field experiment (15.8 vs. 15.6%). The percentage of singles
having casual sex is higher in the field experiment than in the general equilib-
rium one (73 vs. 66%). This transpires because the hike in HIV in the general
equilibrium model dampens risky sexual behavior. This also results in a slightly
higher percentage of casual sex with condoms in the general equilibrium model
(59 vs. 57%). Also, there are more singles in the general equilibrium model, be-
cause at the higher HIV rate the benefit of unprotected sex within a marriage has
dropped relative to short-term protected sex. Now, increase the pleasure from
sex with condoms even further to 7.5. Again, the fraction of singles having ca-
sual sex is higher in the field experiment (78 vs. 73%). Since there is a larger
percentage of sex with condoms, the HIV rate declines in the general equilibrium
model, unlike in the field experiment, where the aggregate HIV rate rises. By
contrast an individual’s odds of catching HIV rise significantly in the field ex-
periment because they are having so much more casual sex, both protected and
unprotected. The drop in the aggregate HIV rate increases the benefit of marriage
relative to short-term protected sex, so the number of singles drops in the gen-
eral equilibrium experiment, unlike in the field experiment where it rises. Thus,
the reaction in the field experiment can be amplified or mitigated relative to the
general equilibrium one.
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Finally, an epidemiological experiment would predict no effect of the condom
policy. This is by construction, as epidemiological experiments assume no change
in behavior, but without behavioral change, the increased condom pleasure by
itself would not do anything. This is worth noting, since in the case of themedical
policies the lack of behavioral adjustments leads to an exaggeration of effects
in the epidemiological experiments. Naturally the opposite is the case in any
experiment where the behavioral adjustments are needed for a policy to work—
as in the case of increasing condom pleasure, where the hope is that more people
would use them.34
One potential concern about this exercise is the substantial increase in the num-
ber of singles, which might be at odds with intuition. People get married for
many reasons, including the desire to have children, and increased condom plea-
sure might not change the determination for marriage for those whom having
children is very important. Additionally, fertility in Malawi is very high byWest-
ern standards. Modeling fertility explicitly goes beyond the scope of this paper,
but an initial step in this direction might be taken by adding a value f for fertil-
ity in marriage that differs by type. Heterogeneity in this fertility benefit implies
that those with strong preferences for children in marriage will not be enticed
out of the marriage market, potentially reducing the responsiveness of marriage
with respect to shifts in condom utility. This means that the per-period utility of
marriage is now u+ l + f. Otherwise the model is unchanged.
As a first attempt to gauge the promise of this channel, consider the following
parametrization: Leave the number of types unchanged from the basic model to
avoid computational complexity, but assume that those types with a high dis-
count factor also have a higher value from fertility (i.e., have a higher f ). Under
the assumption that f has a quadratic form in  , the three parameters charac-
terizing its distribution are chosen to keep the basic calibration targets roughly
unchanged relative to the benchmark model. See Appendix D.2 for more details.
Table VIII shows how close this extended version is to the original benchmark. It
also shows how this new economy reacts to increased pleasure with condoms. In
line with intuition, when peoplemarry partly to have children, their marriage de-
34The same logic would be present for policies aimed to work through the marriage market, as
laid out in Greenwood et al. (2017).
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Table VIII: CONDOMS AND FERTILITY
Benchmark Better condoms Benchmark Better condoms
(w./ fertility) (w./ fertility)
p 1.4 5.5 1.4 5.5
HIV prevalence, % 10.3 15.8 10.0 13.6
Casual sex, % (of all) 15.7 34 18.5 26.9
Casual sex with condom, % 33.0 59 28.9 53.7
Singles who have casual sex, % 54.0 66 65.5 75.4
Single men, % 50 64 49.4 53.4
Single women, % 46 60 44.8 48.2
cision is much less responsive to the introduction of more pleasurable condoms.
Yet, interestingly, improved condoms continue to increase the HIV rate. This is
driven by singles substantially increasing their sexual activity. Overall and as
expected, however, the increase in the HIV rate is smaller (3.6 percentage points
relative to 5.5 percentage points in the benchmark calibration).
5.4 Treating Other Sexually Transmitted Diseases
The treatment of other sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) has been advocated
in the fight against HIV/AIDS, based on the idea that the presence of other STDs
makes a person more susceptible to contracting HIV. Thus, treating other STDs
will decrease the transmission risk, both for men and women. For example,
Grosskurth et al. (1995) finds that improved STD treatment reduced HIV inci-
dence by about 40% in rural Tanzania. Oster (2005) compares data from African
countries to the United States and reaches the conclusion that treating other STDs
would be an effective policy. This conclusion is based on an epidemiological
simulation, which shows that differences in transmission rates (due to the exis-
tence of other STDs) can explain much of the difference in HIV rates between the
United States and Sub-Saharan Africa.
Table IX shows the simulation results for this policy in the model (see the second
column). For this policy, the probability of infection is multiplied by a scaling
factor   2 [0, 1], such that the new transmission rate is  (1    ) for all types
of sex, genders, and circumcision types. As the transmission risk for both men
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Table IX: TREATING OTHER STDS
Benchmark G.E. Epidem. Small Field
Scaling Factor 1.00 0.85 0.85 0.85
HIV prevalence, % 10.3 9.5 7.0 10.1
—Males 8.6 7.9 5.9 8.5
—Females 12.1 11.3 8.2 11.9
Casual sex, % (of all) 15.7 18.7 — 16.7
Casual sex with condom, % 33.0 27.6 — 31.2
Singles who have casual sex, % 54.0 60 — 56
Single men, % 50 52 — 51
Single women, % 46 47 — 46
Price—protected -6.5 10 — —
Price—unprotected 279 286 — —
Price—long term 125 127 — —
and women declines by 15% (  = 0.85), HIV prevalence decreases by almost
one percentage point from 10.3 to 9.5%. This decrease in HIV prevalence masks
the fact that, when faced with better transmission odds when having sex, people
engage in riskier behavior. The fraction of sex that is casual increases from 15.7
to 18.7%. This is because there are more singles now, and singles have more sex.
Moreover, among the singles having sex, condom usage falls from 33 to 28%.
Despite the increase in risky behavior, the policy works in the sense that HIV
does fall overall.
Yet the behavioral changes have non-trivial effects, which can be seen as follows.
Compare the results from the general equilibrium experiment with the epidemi-
ological version of the experiment in the third column of Table IX; see also Figure
3. In the epidemiological experiment, the decline in HIV prevalence is much
larger, dropping to 7%. The reason for this difference is exactly the lack of be-
havioral changes described above. Thus, simulations based on epidemiological
experiments may significantly overstate the beneficial effects of STD treatment.
This casts some doubt on Oster (2005)’s finding that STD treatment alone is able
to explain much of the U.S.-S.S.A. difference in HIV, as the study was based on
the assumption of constant sexual behavior across countries.35
35Oster (2005) argues that sexual behavior in the data is remarkably similar in the United States
and Sub-Saharan Africa. However, her Table II seems to indicate that behavior is somewhat more
risky in the United States, which would be in line with the model, where people in the country
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Figure 3: Treating Other STDs
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The synthetic field experiment goes in the opposite direction: it predicts only a
very small change in HIV prevalence compared to the benchmark. The reason is
that in the field experiment, the reduced number of infections does not lead to an
overall decrease in the population prevalence rate. Therefore, the decrease does
not feed back into lower infection rates for the treated population, something that
is naturally part of the general equilibrium model.
The lack of a substantial HIV decline in the field experiment might actually be
quite important. Note that eight of the nine studies of STD treatment for HIV
prevention surveyed by Padian et al. (2010) delivered flat results. This seems
quite puzzling, given that the theoretical effects of STD treatment are uncontro-
versial in the medical community. The simulations presented here highlight a
novel reason for the lack of finding a large effect, namely the missing equilibrium
effects in randomized field experiments. Thus, treating STDs might actually be a
promising policy measure, even though it is difficult to detect positive results in
field experiments.
with the lower transmission risk engage in more risky behavior.
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6 The Diffusion of Better Information
HIV prevalence in Malawi has fallen over the last two decades, from a peak of
almost 17% in 1999 to less than 10% in 2016. Section 5 suggested that the intro-
duction of ART was not the dominant driver of the falling HIV rate. So what ex-
plains this success story? From the policy experiments, male circumcision seems
to work, yet there was no substantial change in circumcision rates in Malawi
through 2010. Both the promotion of condoms and treatment of other STDs have
been part of the government’s plan to fight HIV (Government of Malawi 2003),
but it is unclear how widely such policies were implemented. Moreover, the pol-
icy experiments show that the condom policy may backfire and the treatment of
other STDs may at most have a modest effect. Thus, both policies seem unlikely
to be the main causes behind the HIV decline. This leaves a bit of a puzzle.
To what extent could better information have caused the decline in HIV? Clearly,
if people are not aware of how HIV is transmitted, or how they can protect them-
selves, they will engage in more risky activities. As information improves, be-
havior becomes less risky, which lowers the HIV prevalence rate.36 Indeed, evi-
dence from the DHS shows that awareness of the HIV transmission mechanisms
massively increased between 1992 and 2004 and has roughly stabilized since; see
Figure 4.37 Specifically, in 1992 only a quarter of the population correctly identi-
fied that abstinence reduces HIV risk, while by 2004 more than three quarters of
the population did so. Similarly, in 1992 only about 10% knew that condom use
reduces risk, while by 2004, 60% did. In 1992 approximately 60% erroneously
believed that HIV can be transmitted through mosquito bites, which fell to about
20% by 2004. It is unclear to what extent improved awareness can be attributed
to official information campaigns or whether it is the natural diffusion of infor-
mation following the discovery of a new disease.38 Without taking a stand on the
36For example, Dupas (2011) finds in a randomized field experiment that Kenyan teenage girls
who are given information about the HIV status of different groups of men respond by shifting
their sexual behavior to the lower-risk groups.
37Figure 4 is based on 6waves of the DHS. It is similar to Figure 3.3 in Fedor (2014), but includes
both men and women and additional information for 2015. The two empty bars are due to the
following: In 1996 the question on mosquitoes was not asked in a consistent way and in 2015 no
information related to abstinence was collected.
38See Fedor (2014) for details on changes inHIV knowledge inMalawi and government policies
that may have contributed to increased awareness.
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underlying reason for the better information, this section asks whether the im-
provement in information about transmission mechanisms can explain the drop
in HIV in recent years in Malawi. This is done by allowing a fraction of the pop-
ulation in the model to be uninformed about HIV.
Figure 4: HIV Awareness in Malawi, 1992–2015, DHS Data
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To model the presence of uninformed individuals, introduce a new variable i 2
{0, 1} in the permanent-type vector, x, characterizing each individual, with the
convention that i = 1 stands for an informed individual and i = 0 for an un-
informed one. Informed individuals know the true structure of transmission.
Uninformed people do not. The survey evidence indicates the presence of indi-
viduals who are not aware that either condoms or abstinence can protect them
from HIV infection. Therefore, assume that uninformed singles believe that the
odds of contracting HIV are the same as in the short-term unprotectedmarket, re-
gardless of their sexual behavior. That is, individuals who either enter the short-
term market for protected sex or who remain abstinent think that they are just
as likely to catch HIV as someone in the short-term unprotected market. (In the
absence of any other anchor for their beliefs about unprotected sex, for simplicity
assume that they assign correct beliefs to unprotected sex.) Note that all sex in the
long-term market is unprotected so nothing changes here. Finally, even though
40
the survey did not directly question individuals about circumcision, it is unlikely
that uninformed individuals were aware of its protective effects. So assume that
uninformed individuals do not assign protective power to circumcision.
The adjustments to themodel required to incorporate the presence of uninformed
people are relatively modest. The value functions for uninformed individuals are
similar to those for informed ones, with just a few changes, which imply different
behaviors between them. Specifically, for a healthy uninformed old individual,
the value of abstinence and short-term sex in equations (1) and (3) are adjusted
by replacing the infection probabilities with those in the short-term unprotected
market. Additionally, set  (c) = 1 for all c, so that individuals do not take cir-
cumcision into account. The modifications to the analogs for young healthy in-
dividuals are identical. For uninformed old individuals in the long-term market,
equation (7) is adjusted so that they do not take the protective effects of circum-
cision into account for themselves or for their circumcised partner. Again, the
same is done for young individuals in the long-term market. Given the deci-
sion rules for uninformed people, the determination of the equilibrium incidence
and prevalence rates is governed by the correct infection probabilities. The exact
equations are presented in Appendix D.1.
Themodel with uninformed people can be used to explore towhat extent changes
in informationmay have been responsible for the decline in HIV over time. Focus
on two years: 1996 and (as before) 2004. Since awareness was relatively high and
stable from 2004 onward, the full-information model is a good approximation of
reality for that year. (Of course, as Figure 4 shows, even in 2004 there are still
some uninformed people.) For 1996 it will be assumed that 60% of the popula-
tion is uninformed, in line with the data.39 Table X gives the results and compares
them to the data for the same two years. The data moments are from two waves
of the DHS (1996 and 2004) except for the HIV incidence and prevalence num-
bers.40 Since the decline in HIV is not targeted in the benchmark calibration, this
39As Figure 4 shows, in 1996, 63% of the population did not know that a condom is effective,
74% did not know that abstinence helps, and (in 1992) 58% erroneously believed that HIV could
be transmitted through mosquitoes.
40The HIV incidence and prevalence numbers are from UNAIDS; see also footnote 25. This
departure from Table II is due to the fact that the 1996 DHS did not collect biomarker information
and hence no HIV prevalence rate can be calculated. Further, none of the DHS has incidence
information.
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Table X: IMPROVED INFORMATION—MODEL VS. DATA
Data Model
1996 2004   in p.p. 1996 2004   in p.p.
HIV prevalence, % 14.6 13.5 -1.1 14.4 10.3 -4.1
HIV incidence per 1,000 healthy 20.4 11.1 -9.3 17.3 11.7 -5.6
Sex that is casual, % 24 18 -6 20 16 -4
Condom use in casual sex, % 29 39 10 28 33 5
Fraction of singles, % 31 33 2 47 48 1
Singles who had casual sex, % 60 47 -13 67 54 -13
gives an additional opportunity to examine the performance of the model.41
The table shows that accounting for the lack of awareness about HIV transmis-
sion mechanisms indeed raises the overall prevalence and incidence rates quite
a bit. The implied decline in the HIV rate is in fact larger than the one observed
in the data. This is not surprising since the model results are based on a steady-
state comparison, while in reality the transitional dynamics would likely take
some time to work out. On this, note that the prevalence rate simply cannot fall
very quickly in the real world because it is a stock variable. It takes time for
the reduction in new infections (incidence) to cumulate through the economy.
Incidence rates actually fell very quickly over this time period, from 20.4 new
infections annually per 1,000 healthy people in 1996 to 11.1 by 2004. The model
implies that a reduction in the fraction of the population that is uninformed from
60% to zero will decrease incidence rates by a similar order of magnitude from
17.3 to 11.7 per 1,000 healthy people. Therefore improved information may well
have played a key role in reducing HIV in Malawi.
The fall in incidence rates is due to safer sexual choices. The adjustments in terms
of sexual behavior are also remarkably close to the data. In themodel, the fraction
of casual sex falls by 4 percentage points (p.p.), condom use increases by 5 p.p.,
the fraction of singles declines by 1 p.p., and among them, 13 p.p. fewer singles
have casual sex. The data shows a very similar trend towards less risky behavior.
From 1996 to 2004 the fraction of casual sex fell by 6 p.p., condom use increased
by 10 p.p., the fraction of singles fell by 2 p.p., and among them 13 p.p. fewer
41In fact, this section was motivated by a suggestion from a referee. The calibration predates
the suggestion.
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singles had casual sex.
Finally, given that in 2004 not all Malawians were perfectly informed, one may
question whether the assumption of perfect awareness in the benchmark model
biases the policy experiments in Section 5. Put differently, one may want to know
what the effect of policies would have been in a world with more uninformed
people. This question is addressed by implementing the same policy experiments
for the 1996 model (i.e., the one with 60% uninformed people). This is reported in
Table XI in Appendix D.1. The table shows that results are qualitatively similar
to those in the full information model. At the same time, all policies are quan-
titatively somewhat more effective in the model with uninformed people. For
example, circumcising all men would lower the HIV rate by 68%, relative to only
46% in the baseline model. In the case of ART the positive effect is seen earlier;
i.e., treating only a third of the population (q = 0.01) leads to a decline in the HIV
rate. The higher effectiveness of the policies is not that surprising, though. Recall
that in the model with perfect information people dampen the effectiveness of
the policies by responding with riskier behavior. Uninformed people do not re-
act as much because they do not understand the true trade-offs between different
sexual behaviors. Thus, the higher the fraction of uninformed people, the better
all policies work in reducing HIV.
7 Conclusions
An equilibrium search model is constructed to analyze the Malawian HIV/AIDS
epidemic. At the heart of the model is homo economicus. Specifically, it is pre-
sumed that men and women rationally search for the type of sexual activity they
desire to engage in, taking into consideration the risks of this activity. Some peo-
ple select stable long-term relationships; others may choose more fleeting ones.
Condoms may or may not be used in ephemeral encounters, depending on the
participants’ mutual desires. The number of such encounters is partially under
people’s control. All of these choices crucially affect the spread of HIV/AIDS in
society.
The theoretical model developed is calibrated to capture some of the salient fea-
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tures of the Malawian HIV/AIDS epidemic. The framework can match both
targeted and non-targeted statistics regarding sexual behavior and HIV/AIDS
in Malawi, as well as some cross-country data. The benchmark simulation is
then used to undertake some policy interventions. The quantitative results sug-
gest that policy analysis of HIV/AIDS interventions is complicated; in particular,
some policies may backfire and actually increase HIV. The simulations also ratio-
nalize some puzzling results in previous works.
Specifically, it is shown that ART is unlikely to have been the main driver behind
the decline in HIV over time. ART can work well, but only if a large fraction
of the population is treated. Second, male circumcision seems a useful policy
with effects that are likely much larger than one would expect based on field
experiments alone. Third, better condoms can potentially backfire and lead to
more HIV. Fourth, the beneficial effects of treating other STDs are much smaller
than suggested by some epidemiological studies. At the same time, the analysis
resolves a puzzle regarding the lack of positive effects in field experiments, due
to their difficulty in capturing the salubrious spillover effects on partners that
operate to reduce the equilibrium HIV prevalence rate. Finally, the research also
explores the likelihood that the Malawian populace was not fully knowledgeable
in the early stages of the epidemic about how HIV is transmitted. As a result,
people who were uninformed did not move into safer sexual activity. It is shown
that as information spread about the HIV transmission mechanism the rate of
HIV fell. Thus, the diffusion of better information appears to be an important
driver of the HIV decline in Malawi over time.
The framework developed here contains several dimensions of heterogeneity.
One can, however, think of different margins that were not explored in the cur-
rent paper. For example, HIV prevalence rates in urban areas tend to be higher
than in rural regions. This may have to do with different search costs in the two
localities.42 Furthermore, the impact of migration between the rural and urban
areas may be important to consider. Additionally, the theoretical model does
not allow for concurrent relationships, while in reality extra-marital affairs and
polygyny may matter for the spread of the virus. Such questions are left for fu-
42Indeed, running a counterfactual in which search costs in the model are increased leads to a
lower HIV prevalence rate.
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ture research.
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A Appendix—Timing of Events
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B Appendix—Data
Most of the empirical moments are based on information collected from the inter-
views of individuals conducted for the Malawi Demographic and Health Survey
(MDHS) in 2004, carried out by the Malawi National Statistical Office. In this na-
tionally representative survey 11,698 women aged 15 to 49 and 3,261men aged 15
to 54 were interviewed. Means are calculated using sample weights. For several
figures means are calculated by age. Since men are underrepresented in the sur-
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vey, separate means are calculated by sex, and then averaged. Whenever sources
other than the MDHS are used, it will be indicated. More details on each fig-
ure follow. For the interested reader the details also include the variable names
corresponding to each question.
• Figure 1a: HIV is defined as “Prevalence of HIV, total (% of population ages
15-49).” ART is defined as “Antiretroviral therapy coverage (% of people
living with HIV).” HIV data comes from UNAIDS and ART coverage is
taken from the World Development Indicators.
• Figure 4 is based on the MDHS for the years 1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2010,
and 2015. The question asked is “What can a person do (to avoid get-
ting AIDS)?” and then various options are given. For 1996 the question on
mosquitoes was not asked in a consistent way and in 2015 no information
related to whether abstinence reduces HIV risk was collected. Fractions
were computed based on the entire sample (males and females); sample
weights were used. The exact list of variables used is as follows. Absti-
nence: women: s808a (1992), qa509a (1996), v754b (2000-2010), men: mv754b
(1992), qma509a (1996), mv754b (2000-2010). Condom use: women: s808c
(1992), qa504 (1996), v754c (2000-2015) men: mv754c (1992), qma504 (1996),
mv754c (2000-2015). Mosquitoes: women: s804g (1992), v754jp (2000-2015)
men: sm504g (1992), mv754jp (2000-2015).
• Figure 6: HIV Rate—Men vs. Women, Model vs. Data
In order to calculate the HIV rates by age (MDHS 2004: v012/mv012) and
gender, individual information from the MDHS 2004 is matched with the
HIV test results (MDHS 2004: hiv03) for those people who agreed on doing
the test along with the interview (since not everyone agreed, the sample
size is smaller here: 2,404 men and 2,864 women). The resulting HIV rates
are smoothed using a third-order polynomial.
• Figure 7: Fraction ever Married—Model vs. Data
The fraction of people who have ever been married is derived by dividing
the number of people who either are currently married (including cohab-
itation) or have been formerly married by all people. The corresponding
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question is “Have you ever been married or lived with a man/woman”
(MDHS 2004: v/mv502).
• Figure 8: Sexual Behavior by Age—Model vs. Data
Singles: Those men and women who reported that they have never been
married or are widowed, divorced (living or not living together) are de-
fined as singles (MDHS 2004: v/mv501).
Casual sex: To identify the fraction of sex that occurs in casual relationships,
all men and women are considered who had sex in the last year (MDHS
2004: v/mv529). These people are asked with whom they had sex (MDHS
2004: v/mv767a). They are also asked whether they had sex with a second
(MDHS 2004: v/mv761b, v/mv767b) and third (MDHS 2004: v/mv761c,
v/mv767c) partner. If one of the sex partners was not the spouse or cohab-
iting partner, then the sex in the last year is categorized as casual sex. Men
in addition are asked whether they have ever paid for sex (MDHS 2004:
mv792). Those men who have paid for sex in the last year are also defined
as being active in the short-term market.
• Figure 9: Deaths by HIV/AIDS by Age—Model vs. Data
The data on deaths caused by HIV/AIDS are taken from Bowie (2006), pp.
31-42. He reports the fraction of HIV/AIDS related deaths by age groups,
based on the WHO Global Burden of Disease Malawi from 2002.
• Table I: Parameters Chosen Outside the Model
All sources are described in the text.
• Table III: Targeted Moments
The data on the prevalence of HIV/AIDS in Malawi derive from the De-
mographic and Health Surveys’ (MDHS) Final Survey for Malawi in 2004.
See MDHS (2004, Table 12.3). The fraction of sex that is casual is the pro-
portion of people—averaged across men and women—who had sex with
a non-marital, non-cohabiting partner during the last year, conditional on
being sexually active, and is taken from MDHS (2004, Table 11.9). Condom
usage for short-term sex also derives fromMDHS (2004, Table 11.9)—and is
averaged across men and women. The fraction of singles who have casual
sex is reported in MDHS (2004, Tables 6.71 and 6.72) and corresponds to
A-3
the weighted average of never married and divorced/separated/widowed
men and women. The proportion of the population that is single is con-
tained in MDHS (2004, Table 6.1), where single is interpreted as anyone
who is not currently married nor cohabiting, averaged across men and wo-
men. The fraction of males and females that has ever been married by a cer-
tain age is the same as in Figure 7. The World Health Organisation (2008)
reports that 29% of all deaths in Malawi in 2004 were due to HIV/AIDS.
• Table IV: The cross-country circumcision data comes from Ahuja, Wendell,
and Werker (2009). The statistics for HIV rates come from UNAIDS, while
the numbers for GDP per capita and ART coverage come from the World
Bank Development Indicators. The rates for syphilis seropositivity relates
to data among antenatal care attendees from the WHO Global Health Ob-
servatory. The fractions of populations of different religions are given by
the Global Religious Futures Project of the Pew Research Center. Condom
prices for different countries are reported in the Global Directory of Con-
dom Social Marketing Projects and Organisations (UNAIDS).
• Table X: Incidence and prevalence numbers are taken from UNAIDS. All
numbers on sexual behavior are computed from the MDHS. The 2004 num-
bers are identical to those in Table III and were calculated as described
above. The numbers for 1996 were computed in exactly the sameway using
data from the MDHS 1996 instead. Model numbers are based on the model
simulations.
C Appendix—Theory
C.1 Value Functions for Young Individuals, d = ◆
The value functions for young individuals follow a similar structure as those
for old individuals, namely equations (1) to (6). The required adjustments are
outlined in the main body in connection with (1).
In particular, for young abstinent individuals of health status   the analog to (1)
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replaces the high discount factor,  , with the low discount factor, ◆, and treats
continuation values as the average of the continuation with a low and a high
discount factor, so that
eV ◆a ( , x) = ln(y)+↵ ◆A+(1 ↵ )◆
(
Q( )[⌘V  l (t, x) + (1  ⌘)V ◆l (t, x)]
+[1 Q( )][⌘V  l ( , x) + (1  ⌘)V ◆l ( , x)]
)
.
(9)
Similarly, for short-term sex, either for infected or treated individuals (  = 0, t),
the analog to (2) is
eV ◆s ( , x) = ln(y   zs) + pI(s) + u[1  I(s)] + ↵ ◆A
+(1  ↵ )◆
(
Q( )[⌘V  l (t, x) + (1  ⌘)V ◆l (t, x)]
+[1 Q( )][⌘V  l ( , x) + (1  ⌘)V ◆l ( , x)]
)
, (10)
for s = p, u. For young healthy individuals (  = 1) the analog to (3) is
eV ◆s (1, x) = ln(y   zs) + pI(s) + u[1  I(s)]
+
X
b Rs(b )[1   s(b )] (c)◆
(
q[⌘V  l (t, x) + (1  ⌘)V ◆l (t, x)]
+(1  q)[⌘V  l (0, x) + (1  ⌘)V ◆l (0, x)]
)
+{1 
X
b Rs(b )[1   s(b )] (c)}◆[⌘V  l (1, x) + (1  ⌘)V ◆l (1, x)].
(11)
For long-term sex, note that the transition probabilities ⌥( 0, b 0| , b , c,bc) in Ap-
pendix C.2 are not affected by the discount factor, and therefore the young indi-
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vidual’s analog of (6) is
eV ◆l ( , b ,bc, x) = ln(y   zl) + u+ l + ↵ ◆A
+(1  ↵ )(1  ✏)(1   )(1  ↵b )◆⇥X
 0,b 0
⌥( 0, b 0| , b , c,bc)" ⌘eV  l ( 0,  ˆ0, x)
+(1  ⌘)eV ◆l ( 0,  ˆ0, x)
#
+(1  ↵ )[1  (1  ✏)(1   )(1  ↵b )]◆⇥X
 0,b 0
⌥( 0, b 0| , b , c,bc)" ⌘V  l ( 0, x)
+(1  ⌘)V ◆l ( 0, x)
#
. (12)
C.2 Transition Probabilities in Long-term Relationships
The transition probabilities, ⌥( 0, b 0| , b , c,bc), from the situation where a rela-
tionship is currently characterized by the quadruple ( , b , c,bc) to one where the
couple’s health status next period is ( 0, b 0), are now presented. Start with the
situation where the person is currently healthy (  = 1) but his partner is infected
( ˆ 2 {0, t}). The following lists all possible cases for this situation:
⌥(1, t|1, b , c,bc) = {1  [1   u(b )] (c)}Q(b );
⌥(1, 0|1, b , c,bc) = {1  [1   u(b )] (c)}[1 Q(b )];
⌥(0, t|1, b , c,bc) = [1   u(b )] (c)(1  q)Q(b );
⌥(0, 0|1, b , c,bc) = [1   u(b )] (c)(1  q)[1 Q(b )];
⌥(t, t|1, b , c,bc) = [1   u(b )] (c)qQ(b );
⌥(t, 0|1, b , c,bc) = [1   u(b )] (c)q[1 Q(b )].
(13)
The chance that the individual remains healthy is given by {1  [1   u(b )] (c)},
while the odds that they will not are [1   u(b )] (c). In the latter case, the person
will get treated with probability q and not with 1   q. The term Q(b ) reflects the
odds of the partner being treated, while the one 1 Q(b ) gives the odds that the
companion is not.
The symmetric probabilities for when the partner is healthy (b  = 1) but the indi-
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vidual is infected or treated (  = 0, t) are:
⌥(t, 1| , 1,bc, c) = {1  [1  b u( )] (bc)}Q( );
⌥(0, 1| , 1,bc, c) = {1  [1  b u( )] (bc)}[1 Q( )];
⌥(t, 0| , 1,bc, c) = [1  b u( )] (bc)(1  q)Q( );
⌥(0, 0| , 1,bc, c) = [1  b u( )] (bc)(1  q)[1 Q( )];
⌥(t, t| , 1,bc, c) = [1  b u( )] (bc)qQ( );
⌥(0, t| , 1,bc, c) = [1  b u( )] (bc)q[1 Q( )].
(14)
In the above equations, the term [1   b u( )] (bc) gives the odds that the partner
will become infected.
Next, both partners might be infected (  2 {0, t} and  ˆ 2 {0, t}), in which case a
healthy future is no longer an option. The only question that remains is whether
the future sees treatment or not, so that
⌥( 0, b 0| , b , c,bc) =
8>>>><>>>>:
[1 Q( )]Q(b ), for ( 0, b 0) = (0, t);
[1 Q( )][1 Q(b )], for ( 0, b 0) = (0, 0);
Q( )Q(b ), for ( 0, b 0) = (t, t);
Q( )[1 Q(b )], for ( 0, b 0) = (t, 0).
(15)
The last remaining case is where both partners are currently healthy. Here,⌥(1, 1|1, 1, c,bc) =
1, implying that ⌥( 0, b 0|1, 1, c,bc) = 0, when  0 2 {0, t} and/or b 0 2 {0, t}.
C.3 Stationary Equilibrium
A stationary equilibrium for the developed framework is formulated now. First,
the equilibrium distributions for singles will be specified. Let Sd( ; x) represent
the (non-normalized) stationary distribution of singles at the beginning of a pe-
riod. It denotes the measure of type-x singles that have health status   and dis-
count factor d. Similarly, let Ld( , b ; x, bx) stand for the measure of long-term re-
lationships for type-x individuals with health status   and discount factor dwho
are coupled with a partner of type bx and health status b . Given some distribu-
tions S and L of singles and married people, the sexual behavior of individuals
according to their decision rule ⇧ [⇧dr = ⇧dr( , x) for each status and type] gives
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rise to a new distribution of singles and married people, which can be described
by a mapping T that is characterized fully in Section C.4. In steady state the dis-
tributions of singles and married people remain constant, and are determined by
a fixed point of this operator:
(S ,L ,S ◆,L◆) = T(S ,L  ,S ◆,L◆;⇧). (16)
Next, the expectations over the fraction of types in each market have to be con-
sistent with the aggregation of individual choices in equilibrium. It is now useful
to introduce the subscript g (for g = f,m) to a function or variable to denote the
gender of the person in question. The number of market participants for sexual
activity r (= l, p, u), who are of gender g, type-xwith status  , and discount factor
d, is given by
Mdg,r( , x) ⌘
(
⇧dg,r( , x)Sdg ( ; x), if r = l,
[1  ⇧dg,l( , x)]⇧dg,r( , x)Sdg ( ; x), if r = p, u.
(17)
The number of market participants equals the number of singles times their prob-
ability of participating in a particular market. For the short-term market this also
entails the probability of not previously finding a long-term partner within the
current period. Then the fraction Rs,r( ) of agents with health status   in market
s of gender g is given by
Rg,s( ) =
P
d
P
xMdg,s( , x)P
d
P
x
P
 0 Mdg,s( 0, x)
, for all g and s 2 {p, u}. (18)
For the long-term market, the relevant fraction is given by:
Rg,l( , c) =
P
d
P
xMdg,l( , x)I(c(x) = c)P
d
P
x
P
 0 Mdg,l( 0, x)
, for all g, (19)
where c(x) is a slight abuse of notation that denotes the circumcision status of the
agent that is contained in his or her type x. The function I(·) is an indicator func-
tion that takes the value of 1 if its argument is true. Note thatRf,s( ) andRf,l( , c)
denote the distributions among women, which are relevant for men when deter-
mining their odds of getting infected. Similarly, Rm,s( ) andRm,l( , c) refer to the
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odds among men, but are relevant for womenwhen making their decisions.
Market clearing requires that the number of female participants equals the num-
ber of male participants in any market:X
d
X
x
X
 
Mdf,r( , x) =
X
d
X
x
X
 
Mdm,r( , x), for all r. (20)
Additionally, a transfer paid by one gender on a market is a transfer earned by
the other so that
zf,r + zm,r = 0, for all r. (21)
This leads to the following formal definition of equilibrium.
Definition. A stationary equilibrium is described by a set of decision rules for
search effort, ⇧dg,r( , x), a set of transfer payments, zg,r, a set of stationary distri-
butions, Sdg ( ; x) and Ldg( , b ; x, bx), and status/type prevalence in each market,
Rg,s( ) and Rg,l( , c), for all d = {◆,  }, g 2 {f,m}, r 2 {l, p, u}, s 2 {p, u}, such
that:
1. The decision rules for search intensities, ⇧dg,r( , x), satisfy the appropriately
gender subscripted versions of the generic problems (4) and (8), taking as
given transfer payments and HIV/AIDS prevalence rates;
2. The stationary distributions, Sdg ( ; x) and Ldg( , b ; x, bx), solve the appropri-
ately gender subscripted version of (16);
3. The distributions over health status for each market, Rg,s( ) and Rg,l( , c),
are given by (18) and (19) using (17);
4. The transfer payments, zr,g, are such that the markets for all types of rela-
tionships clear according to (20). Additionally, the flow of transfers across
the genders must balance as specified by (21).
C.4 Stationary Distributions
The transition operator T defined in the Section C.3 is now fully characterized.
Before starting, recall that I(·) is an indicator function that takes the value of 1,
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if its argument is true, and 0 otherwise. Focus on a particular gender so that
the gender subscript can be omitted. Again, Sd( ; x) denotes the beginning-of-
period mass of singles with discount factor d, health status  , and type x. Next,
Ld( , b ; x, bx) represents the beginning-of-period measure of long-term relation-
ships for individuals of type xwith health status   and discount factor dwho are
coupled with a partner of type bx and health status b . Finally, A is the mass of
individuals with the final symptoms of AIDS. The sexual behavior of individuals
is governed by their decision rules, ⇡dr = ⇧dr( , x).
Assume temporarily that only people who are of health status   = t will be
treated next period.Moreover, suppose that the individual’s discount factor does
not change. Given the beginning of period distributions Sd, Ld, and A one can
compute the distributions at the beginning of next period under these assump-
tions. Call these S 0d, L0d, and A0. These will be adjusted subsequently for chang-
ing treatment status and discount factors. Before proceeding, define the follow-
ing variable to represent the infectiousness of each short-term market:
b✓s =Xb Rs(b )[1   s(b )], for s 2 {p, u}. (22)
First consider next period’s distribution of single individuals. Consider first the dis-
tribution of healthy singles next period:
S 0d(1, x) = (1   )⇥ {
Sd(1, x)[1  ⇧dl (1, x)]{1  ⇧dp(1, x)  ⇧du(1, x) +
X
s
⇧ds(1, x)[1  b✓s (c)]}
+
X
b ,bx[Ld(1, b ; x, bx) +Rl(b ,bc)⇧dl (1, x)Sd(1, x)]{1  [1   u(b )] (c)}
⇥[1  (1   )(1  ↵b )(1  ")] }
+µ(x)I(d = ◆). (23)
Singles survive into the next period with probability (1    ), as captured by the
first line. The second line accounts for healthy singles this period that continue
as healthy singles next period. There are Sd(1, x) such singles this period. They
remain healthy singles if they do not successfully enter the long-term market,
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which is represented by the term in the first bracket, and if they either do not
enter the short-term market or enter but do not get infected, as presented by
the terms in braces. The third and fourth lines account for those who exit from
marriage as healthy singles. The terms in the first bracket give the stock of in-
dividuals married to a partner of status b  at the start of the period plus those
singles who newly marry such a partner this period. They remain healthy with
probability {1  [1   u(b )] (c)}, but the marriage breaks up with the probability
in the bracket on the fourth line, [1   (1    )(1   ↵b )(1   ")]. The final line is the
inflow of newborns.
Consider next the distribution of infected individuals without treatment next pe-
riod:
S 0d(0, x) = (1   )⇥ {
Sd(1, x)[1  ⇧dl (1, x)]
X
s
⇧ds(1, x)b✓s (c)
+
X
b ,bx[Ld(1, b ; x, bx) +Rl(b ,bc)⇧dl (1, x)Sd(1, x)][1   u(b )] (c)
⇥[1  (1   )(1  ↵b )(1  ")]
+Sd(0, x)(1  ↵0)[1  ⇧dl (0, x)]
+(1  ↵0)
X
b ,bx[Ld(0, b ; x, bx) +Rl(b ,bc)⇧dl (0, x)Sd(0, x)]
⇥[1  (1   )(1  ↵b )(1  ")] } . (24)
The first four lines detail the same elements as in the previous equation, but now
healthy individuals only transit to the untreated infected state,   = 0. Line five
captures currently infected singles, who do not develop final stage symptoms
with probability 1   ↵0 and who do not enter the long-term market with proba-
bility 1   ⇧dl (0, x), and therefore survive as infected singles. Lines six and seven
account for individuals that either started in marriage or got married, similar to
lines three and four, except now these individuals are currently infected. Again
they return as infected singles, if they do not develop final stage symptoms, and
if the marriage does not survive.
Finally, the distribution of treated individuals next period is given by
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S 0d(t, x) = (1   )⇥ {
Sd(t, x)(1  ↵t)[1  ⇧dl (t, x)]
+(1  ↵t)
X
b ,bx[Ld(t, b ; x, bx) +Rl(b ,bc)⇧dl (t, x)Sd(t, x)]
⇥[1  (1   )(1  ↵b )(1  ")] } . (25)
The four lines here correspond to lines one, five, six, and seven in the previous
expression. The reason the intermediate lines are dropped is the temporary as-
sumption that only individuals who were already in treatment at the beginning
of the period are eligible for treatment next period. This will be adjusted later.
The mass of individuals with final stage symptoms next period is
A =
X
d, ,x
(1   ){(1   2)A+ [Sd( , x) +
X
b ,bx Ld( , b , x, bx)]↵ }. (26)
It comprises those that started the period in the final stage and neither died of
natural causes nor of AIDS related reasons. It also includes all other individuals
who develop final stage symptoms, which occurs with probability ↵ .
Now consider the distribution of long-term marriages next period for type-x individ-
uals with health status   and discount factor d who are coupled with a type-bx
partner with health status b . Start with a marriage between two healthy indi-
viduals. The marriage survives if neither spouse dies of natural causes or the
marriage does not break up exogenously. The stock of marriages next period in-
cludes marriages in current period made up from both old and new ones. The
mass of such marriages next period is
L0d(1, 1; x, bx) = (1   )2(1  ")
⇥ {Ld(1, 1; x, bx) + [1 Rl(0,bc) Rl(t,bc)]⇧dl (1, x)Sd(1, x)}. (27)
Next move onto the case where the partner is infected or treated. The terms
are similar to before, only now marriages breaks up for one additional reason;
namely, the partner develops AIDS (probability ↵b ). The person stays healthy
with probability {1  [1   u(b )] (c)}. So,
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L0d(1, b ; x, bx) = (1   )2(1  ")(1  ↵b ){1  [1   u(b )] (c)}
⇥ [Ld(1, b ; x, bx) +Rl(b ,bc)⇧dl (1, x)Sd(1, x)]. (28)
A similar expression obtains for partnerships where the individual under con-
sideration is infected or treated but the partner is healthy:
L0d( , 1; x, bx) = (1   )2(1  ")(1  ↵ ){1  [1  b u( )] (bc)}
⇥ [Ld( , 1; x, bx) +Rl(1,bc)⇧dl ( , x)Sd( , x)]. (29)
In the case where both spouses are infected or treated there is no longer the need
to take into account the transmission of the disease. Now there is a chance that
either person will develop symptoms. So,
L0d( , b ; x, bx) = (1   )2(1  ")(1  ↵ )(1  ↵b )
⇥ [Ld( , b ; x, bx) +Rl(b ,bc)⇧dl ( , x)Sd( , x)]. (30)
Finally, introduce the adjustments for a changing discount factor and changing treat-
ment status, which are mechanical parts of the model that do not involve many
choices. Incorporate discount factor changes first. To do this, let D00d represent
generic auxiliary distributions that result from incorporating the transitions from
the previousD0d due to changing discount factors. High-discount factor individ-
uals stay with a high discount factor, but low-discount factor people switch to a
high discount factor with probability ⌘. Hence,
D00 ( , · · · ) = D0 ( , · · · ) + ⌘D0◆( , · · · ), (31)
D00◆( , · · · ) = (1  ⌘)D0i( , · · · ). (32)
To give examples, S 00 ( , x) = S 0 ( , x) + ⌘S 0◆( , x) counts the number of type-x
singles of health status   that end up with the high discount,  . Another example
would be L00◆( , b ; x, bx) = (1  ⌘)L0◆( , b ; x, bx).
The analysis focuses on steady states for the model. Therefore, the fixed point
of the operator T in (16) is being sought. The stationary distributions for singles
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and marrieds can now be recovered by taking into account changes in treatment
status, since infected individuals with status 0 change to a treated status t with
probability q:
Sd(1, x) = S 00d(1, x),
Sd(0, x) = S 00d(0, x)(1  q),
Sd(t, x) = S 00d(0, x)q + S 00d(t, x),
Ld(1, 1, x, bx) = L00d(1, 1, x, bx),
Ld(1, 0, x, bx) = L00d(1, 0, x, bx)(1  q),
Ld(0, 1, x, bx) = L00d(0, 1, x, bx)(1  q),
Ld(0, 0, x, bx) = L00d(0, 0, x, bx)(1  q)2,
Ld(1, t, x, bx) = L00d(1, 0, x, bx)q + L00d(1, t, x, bx),
Ld(t, 1, x, bx) = L00d(0, 1, x, bx)q + L00d(t, 1, x, bx),
Ld(0, t, x, bx) = L00d(0, t, x, bx)(1  q) + L00d(0, 0, x, bx)(1  q)q,
Ld(t, 0, x, bx) = L00d(t, 0, x, bx)(1  q) + L00d(0, 0, x, bx)q(1  q),
Ld(t, t, x, bx) = L00d(t, t, x, bx) + L00d(0, t, x, bx)q + L00d(t, 0, x, bx)q + L00d(0, 0, x, bx)q2.
The right-hand sides of these equations together with (23) to (32) fully describe
the fixed point of the operator T in (16).
D Appendix—Details on Model Extensions
D.1 The Diffusion of Better Information
To capture uninformed individuals, consider a type-x person with i = 0. Let
s˚ 2 {a, p, u} and define I˚ (˚s) = 1, for s˚ = p, and I˚ (˚s) = 0, otherwise. Likewise,
define Js˚(˚s) = 0, if s˚ = a, and Js˚(˚s) = 1, otherwise. If healthy, the value from
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short-term sex, for s˚ = {a, u, p}, is now given by
eV  s˚ (1, x) = ln(y   zs˚) + {pI˚ (˚s) + u[1  I˚ (˚s)]}Js˚(˚s)
+
X
b Ru(b )[1   u(b )] [qV  l (t, x) + (1  q)V  l (0, x)]
+{1 
X
b Ru(b )[1   u(b )]} V  l (1, x), (33)
where za = 0. Compared to the value function for informed individuals (3), un-
informed people perceive all sex as being as risky as unprotected sex without
circumcision. In the case of abstinence, the uninformed now worry about infec-
tion even when they don’t have sex—cf. (1).
In the long-term market an uninformed individual thinks that transmissions are
governed as if people are not circumcised. That means that for a uniformed type-
x individual (so that i = 0)
eV  l ( , b ,bc, x) = ln(y   zl) + u+ l + ↵  A
+(1  ↵ )(1  ✏)(1   )(1  ↵b ) 
X
 0,b 0
⌥( 0, b 0| , b , 0, 0)eV  l ( 0, b 0,bc, x)
+(1  ↵ )[1  (1  ✏)(1   )(1  ↵b )] 
X
 0,b 0
⌥( 0, b 0| , b , 0, 0)V  l ( 0, x).
(Note that c and bc have been set to 0 in the transition probability ⌥.) Similar
adjustments need to be made for young uninformed type-x individuals. Now,
eV ◆s˚ (1, x) = ln(y   zs˚) + {pI˚ (˚s) + u[1  I˚ (˚s)]}Js˚(˚s)
+
X
b Ru(b )[1   u(b )]◆
(
q[⌘V  l (t, x) + (1  ⌘)V ◆l (t, x)]
+(1  q)[⌘V  l (0, x) + (1  ⌘)V ◆l (0, x)]
)
+{1 
X
b Ru(b )[1   u(b )]}◆[⌘V  l (1, x) + (1  ⌘)V ◆l (1, x)],
for s˚ = {a, u, p}. Last, the value function for a young uninformed individual in a
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Table XI: IMPROVED INFORMATION—MODEL VS. DATA
Bench. Condoms Circumcision ART STDs
p = 5.5 100% q = 0.01 q = 0.075  mu = 0.9
Panel (a): 1996 benchmark
HIV prevalence, % 14.4 20.7 4.5 12.7 7.0 11.1
Sex that is casual, % 19.8 34.6 26.2 21.6 35.0 20.2
Condom use (singles), % 27.9 48.8 25.8 26.4 26.0 26.4
Fraction of singles, % 47.4 58.9 50.3 47.5 58.1 46.2
Non-abstinent singles, % 66.8 72.2 82.1 73.1 86.1 71.7
Panel (b): 2004 benchmark
HIV prevalence, % 10.3 15.8 5.6 11.3 8.1 9.5
Sex that is casual, % 15.7 34.0 28.9 20.5 41.5 18.7
Condom use (singles), % 32.8 59.2 22.4 27.2 24.1 27.6
Fraction of singles, % 48.0 62.4 56.7 51.1 65.7 49.6
Non-abstinent singles, % 53.6 66.4 75.6 62.5 83.6 60.3
long-term relationship is
eV ◆l ( , b ,bc, x) = ln(y   zl) + u+ l + ↵ ◆A
+(1  ↵ )(1  ✏)(1   )(1  ↵b )◆⇥X
 0,b 0
⌥( 0, b 0| , b , 0, 0)" ⌘eV  l ( 0,  ˆ0, x)
+(1  ⌘)eV ◆l ( 0,  ˆ0, x)
#
+(1  ↵ )[1  (1  ✏)(1   )(1  ↵b )]◆⇥X
 0,b 0
⌥( 0, b 0| , b , 0, 0)" ⌘V  l ( 0, x)
+(1  ⌘)V ◆l ( 0, x)
#
.
Table XI reports the results of selected policy experiments using the environ-
ment with uninformed individual as a starting point—Panel (a): 1996 bench-
mark. For ease of comparison, the table also reports the results using the bench-
mark calibration—Panel (b): 2004 benchmark. As discussed in Section 6, in
general, policies implemented when there are uninformed agents tend to have
stronger effects. The reason is that uninformed agents do not change their be-
havior in response to the policy change.
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D.2 Fertility
This little appendix describes how the model is parameterized when there is het-
erogeneous utility for fertility within marriage, as described in Section 5.3. Note
that, conditional on an individual’s circumcision status, there is only one source
of permanent heterogeneity in the benchmarkmodel: the time discount factors,  
and ◆. Since there is a one-to-one correspondence between   and ◆, think about  
as summarizing this heterogeneity. To keep the computational complexity fixed,
leave the number of types constant. That is, for each type-x person with a differ-
ent discount factor,  , assign a different level of utility from fertility f(x); again,
f(x) is really just changing with  . Now, the instantaneous utility from a long-
term relationship is given by u+ l + f(x).
Assume a quadratic form for the utility from fertility such that f(x) = ✓0 + ✓1  +
✓2 2, regardless of the value for c and ◆. Note that ✓0 and l cannot be separately
identified given the linear form of utility. Thus, three values must be calibrated:
✓0 + l, ✓1, and ✓2. These are picked such that the new model fits the baseline
data targets as closely as possible. The resulting parameters are: ✓0 = 28207,
✓1 =  58380, and ✓2 = 30201. The fertility benefit f(x) ranges from -1.55 to 21.23.
Table XII reports results from this new parametrization.
E Appendix—Life-cycle Implications
Figure 6 plots HIV/AIDS prevalence by age.43 Both the data and model agree on
a hump-shaped infection pattern, despite the fact that individuals in the model
become sexually active earlier than is observed in the Malawian data, which
shifts the model’s life-cycle predictions on HIV/AIDS infections to the left. The
hump-shaped pattern is explained by two opposing forces. First, the rise in
HIV/AIDS infection is due to the fact that older people have been sexually active
for a longer period of time. Therefore, a larger percentage of the older population
is infected with HIV/AIDS. Second, people who are infected early in life will die
before they make it to old age. Put differently, people who have made it to old
43The data is fitted with a third-order polynomial. The somewhat choppy raw data is due to
the small sample sizes.
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Table XII: CALIBRATION—FERTILITY
Observation Data Model Model
benchmark w./ fertility
HIV prevalence, % 11.8 10.3 10.0
—Males 10 8.6 8.3
—Females 13 12.1 11.8
Sex that is casual, % (of all) 18 16 18
Condom use for casual sex, % 39 33 29
Singles that had casual sex in past year, % 47 54 65
Singles, % 33 48 47
Married by age 22, %
—Males 58 57 54
—Females 90 63 58
Married by age 50, %
—Males 100 98 78
—Females 100 98 88
Deaths related to HIV, % 29 25 32
age must be those who have engaged in less risky sexual behavior and so are less
likely to be infected with HIV/AIDS. This second effect explains the eventual
drop in HIV/AIDS prevalence seen at older ages. Figure 6 also illustrates the dif-
ferential patterns of infection between the sexes. The figure shows that women
get infected earlier than men, both in the data and model.
Figure 7 compares the fraction of the population that has ever married in the
model vs. the data. The model generates the earlier marriage of women (relative
to men) via their higher infection risk. Men eventually “catch up,” and by age 50
almost everyone is married, both in the data and model.
The model also does a very nice job of matching the decline in risky activity over
the life cycle. Older people are less likely to be single, see Figure 8. As people
age, they are thus less likely to engage in casual sex; this is also reported in Figure
8. The fact that the discount factor stochastically rises with age helps to generate
this pattern.
An additional prediction of the model relates to the causes of death, since indi-
viduals may die either due to HIV/AIDS or due to other natural causes. Figure 9
compares the model prediction over the life cycle with its data counterpart. Both
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Figure 6: HIV Prevalence Rate—Men vs. Women, Model vs. Data
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Figure 7: Fraction of Population ever Married—Model vs. Data
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Figure 8: Sexual Behavior by Age—Model vs. Data
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the data and model exhibit a hump-shaped pattern of HIV/AIDS-caused deaths;
this is consistent with the hump-shaped pattern of infection rates.
F Appendix—Robustness
This appendix provides some sensitivity analysis regarding the parameters esti-
mated on Section 4. Recall that 11 parameters were chosen by fitting the model
to a specific set of data moments from Malawi. These are listed on the different
rows of Tables XIII and XIV. Each of these two tables has three columns be-
sides the first that lists the parameters. The column labeled “HIV—benchmark”
provides the HIV prevalence rate when the parameter of each corresponding
row is changed by 1% (Table XIII) or 10% (Table XIV).44 The column “ HIV—
circumcision (50%)” reports the change in HIV rate under the intervention that
circumcises 50% of the males in the economy. Finally, the last column ( HIV—
ART (q = 5%)) presents the change in HIV rate when the infected have a 5%
44To be precise, the rows for the discount factors ( max and  min) report changes on the dis-
count rates ⇢ = (1   )/ .
A-20
Figure 9: Deaths by HIV/AIDS by Age, Fraction—Model vs. Data
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probability of receiving ART in each period.
Table XIII shows that the benchmark is quite robust when the parameters are
changed by 1%. The HIV prevalence rate is always remarkably close to the
10.3% found in the benchmark calibration. Moreover, the results from the two
main policy experiments (male circumcision and ART) are also very close to the
changes found in the benchmark. Juxtapose these numbers with the ones re-
ported in Table XIV, in which each parameter is changed by 10%. The percentage
change now is considerably larger. Correspondingly, the HIV prevalence rate
now changes compared with the main calibration. This suggests that, in order
to fit the moments targeted in the calibration, the parameters should be close to
the ones found in the estimation. At the same time, the percentage changes in
the policy experiments are remarkably similar, even if individual parameters are
changed by 10%.
A-21
Table XIII: ROBUSTNESS—1%
HIV—benchmark  HIV—circumcision (50%)  HIV—ART (q = 5%)
Main calibration 10.3 -1.2 -0.8
p 10.3 -1.2 -0.7
u 10.2 -1.2 -1.1
l 10.1 -1.2 -1.0
 max 10.3 -1.2 -0.8
 min 10.4 -1.3 -0.8
◆change 10.2 -1.2 -0.7
A 10.3 -1.2 -0.9
⌘ 10.2 -1.2 -0.7
!s 10.2 -1.2 -0.9
!l 10.3 -1.2 -0.7
 10.3 -1.2 -0.8
Table XIV: ROBUSTNESS—10%
HIV—benchmark  HIV—circumcision (50%)  HIV—ART (q = 5%)
Main calibration 10.3 -1.2 -0.8
p 10.3 -1.2 -0.8
u 9.1 -1.5 0.0
l 8.8 -1.3 0.3
 max 10.3 -1.2 -0.8
 min 11.4 -1.5 -1.8
◆change 9.0 -0.5 0.5
A 10.3 -1.2 -0.8
⌘ 9.8 -1.1 -0.3
!s 9.8 -1.3 -0.5
!l 10.9 -1.3 -1.3
 10.1 -1.2 -0.7
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G Appendix—Computational Details
A capsule summary of the numerical algorithm used to solve the benchmark
model is provided here. There are two key steps. The first step involves solving
the model for a given set of parameter values. In the second step, the algorithm
picks the parameter values to match the model’s output with the data targets as
closely as possible. The first step proceeds as follows:
1. The static problems (4) and (8) that yield themeeting probabilities are solved.
The solution to these problems imply that each ⇡ can be implicitly written
as a nonlinear function of the difference between either two eV ’s or a eV and
V . Given a grid of values for the eV ’s and V ’s, the ⇡’s can be computed using
the bisection method. The values for the ⇡’s when the eV ’s and V ’s lie off
the grid can be obtained using an interpolation scheme.
2. One outer loop solves for the market-clearing prices using the NEWUOA
algorithm. This algorithm picks the prices to minimize excess demand in
the three relationship markets.
3. In an inner loop the value functions and stationary distributions are deter-
mined computationally, given prices, using standard iterative procedures.
First the “matched” value functions (the eV ’s) are computed for each type of
individual. Then, the ex ante value functions (the V ’s) are calculated using
a linear interpolation scheme that employs the results from 1. The station-
ary distributions are computed using the formulas in Appendices C.3 and
C.4.
In the second step the parameters values are calibrated using a Pattern Search
algorithm. The calibration algorithm and the solutions to the static problems in 1
are implemented inMATLAB, while the more computationally demanding loops
in 2 and 3 are coded in FORTRAN.
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